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NO OUTSOURCING OF LAW? W TO LAW AS PRACTICED
BY W TO COURTS
By Petros C. Mavroidis*
This article provides a critical assessment of the corpus of law that the adjudicating bodies
of the World Trade Organization (W TO)—the Appellate Body (AB) and panels1 —have
used since the organization was established on January 1, 1995.2 After presenting a taxonomy
of WTO law, I move to discern, and to provide a critical assessment of, the philosophy of the
W TO adjudicating bodies, when called to interpret it. In discussing the law that W TO adju-
dicating bodies have used, I distinguish between sources of WTO law and interpretative ele-
ments. This distinction will be explicated in part I below. Part II provides a taxonomy of the
sources of WTO law, and part III a taxonomy of the interpretative elements used to illuminate
those sources. Part IV concludes.
I. TERMINOLOGY
The term sources of law refers to the law governing relations among parties in an adjudicative
setting. The parties themselves have the power to identify the law that an adjudicator whom
they appoint will apply to their relationship. With the exception of jus cogens, from which no
deviation is allowed—states have complete contractual autonomy to determine the law that
will regulate their relations.
The W TO is an organization based upon an international contract among sovereign states
and customs territories.3 W TO members are bound in their behavior not only by W TO law,
but also by a panoply of other customary and conventional international law, which is not nec-
essarily symmetric for all of them. The focus of this article is not the law that governs their
behavior in international relations in general, but rather the law that they are obligated to
observe by virtue of their W TO membership—which is how the term sources of law is under-
stood here. Through the regulatory framework embedded in the W TO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), the W TO members (principals) have provided W TO “courts”4
* Edwin B. Parker Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, Professor of Law at the University of Neuchâtel,
and Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. I would like to thank Pauline Lièvre for endless
discussions on this issue, and Eyal Benvenisti for excellent comments on a previous draft. This article is for David
Palmeter.
1 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is not an adjudicating body since it can only adopt or reject (as presented)
the findings of panels or the Appellate Body (AB).
2 The cutoff date is July 31, 2007.
3 The term “contract” has no special connotation in this article. It is used as equivalent to “agreement,” “con-
tractual arrangement,” or similar expressions.
4 There are two such bodies, as briefly alluded to above: panels, which are the ‘court’ of first instance, and the AB,
which hears appeals against panel reports. To be sure, the term “courts” is not used in the W TO agreements. Panels
and the AB are usually referred to in literature as quasi-judicial bodies since adjudication in the W TO contains
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(agents) with the authority to interpret those sources of law. And agents must, in turn, perform
their tasks without undoing the balance of rights and obligations as struck by the principals.5
The sources of WTO law are the covered agreements that appear in Appendix 1 of the
DSU.6 These agreements include, through incorporation, provisions of various other interna-
tional agreements, which should also be regarded as sources of WTO law.7
The covered and incorporated agreements, as described above, do not exhaust the W TO
sources of law. There are additional sources of WTO law—namely, (1) state practice, (2) sec-
ondary law, and (3) the exercise of implied powers by W TO adjudicating bodies.
elements of diplomacy: bilateral consultations must precede the referral of a dispute to a panel. Once a dispute has
been referred to a panel, however, the procedure is quintessentially judicial.
5 Article 3.2 of the W TO Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that the dispute settlement system “can-
not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” See Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter DSU], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter W TO Agreement], Annex 2, in WORLD TRADE ORGA-
NIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TEXTS 354 (1999) [hereinafter THE LEGAL TEXTS], 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 (1994). The scope of the
powers entrusted on W TO courts is thus clearly delimited: the W TO members did not entrust them with powers
beyond clarifying (interpreting) the covered agreements. W TO legal texts are available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.
6 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194 [hereinafter
GATT] (regulating trade in goods), the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, W TO Agreement,
supra note 5, Annex 1B, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 5, at 284 (1999), 1869 UNTS 183, reprinted in 33 ILM
1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] (trade in services), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, W TO Agreement, Annex 1C, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 5, at 320 (1999), 1869
UNTS 299, reprinted in 33 ILM 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (regulating trade related intellectual
property rights), and the DSU: these four agreements bind all W TO members. To those, the framers added the
four plurilateral agreements that were in force on January 1, 1995, and that bind a subset of the W TO membership
only (those that accepted to adhere to these arrangements). The W TO AB has, from early on, construed all of the
multilateral covered agreements as one agreement, that is, the W TO Agreement and its annexes.
7 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is also limited in the cases that it may hear and may also be limited in
the law that it can apply. Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, although it is taken as a statement of the sources of public
international law, serves to define, in effect, the law applicable by the ICJ, at least insofar as the compromis providing
the ICJ with authority in any particular adjudication does not specify a more limited universe of law. The article
provides as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are sub-
mitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by
the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qual-
ified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties
agree thereto.
Some voices in the literature suggest that the ICJ’s legislative will can still be further fine-tuned. Higgins, for exam-
ple, has taken the view that there are two sources of public international law: treaty and custom. ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT (1994). She distances herself from the
position that general principles of law are a source of law, arguing that a general principle of law serves the purpose
of interpreting other sources of law rather than creating autonomous rights and obligations. This assertion is true for
most principles, but there are some borderline cases. For example, estoppel, see infra notes 91–96 and accompanying
text, is a general principle of law accepted as such across international jurisdictions. It is not, however, an interpre-
tative source of law; rather, it conditions the right to exercise what would otherwise be one’s legal rights.
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None of these terms is self-interpreting, so illustrations are appropriate here. With respect
to state practice, a plausible case can be made that Article XXIX of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade8 (GATT) has fallen into desuetude as a result of state practice. This provision
requires W TO members to observe certain chapters of the Havana Charter,9 pending the
acceptance of the latter and the establishment of the International Trade Organization (ITO).
The ITO never came into being, and it seems certain that it will not: the advent of the W TO
on January 1, 1995, signaled the definitive end to the ITO saga. In the 1960s and 1970s, many
of the countries that had acceded to the GATT had no domestic competition law and were
engaging, as is widely reported in the literature, in restrictive business practices, thus violating
the letter and the spirit of Chapter V of the Havana Charter, one of the chapters that they were
supposedly expected to observe by virtue of GATT Article XXIX. Since no complaint has ever
been filed alleging a violation of Article XXIX, the available evidence suggests that in W TO
state practice, the provision is legally inoperative.10 State practice can thus relegate a source of
law into desuetude.11
With respect to secondary law, the covered agreements themselves establish a series of WTO
organs and provide them with the legal capacity to create law. Article IX of the W TO Agree-
ment,12 for example, states that the W TO members can, through joint action, adopt inter-
pretations of the existing legal framework, and Article X provides that members can, through
joint action, adopt amendments of the W TO Agreement. Indeed, the road to adopting the first
ever W TO amendment has been opened, following a decision by the W TO General Council
to amend Article 31 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, as I discuss below. The W TO Agreement thus provides for something akin to second-
ary law.13 The power to adopt interpretations or amendments is conferred, by virtue of these
provisions, to the highest organs established, the W TO Ministerial Council and General
Council.
Under this category of secondary law, the work of the various lower in hierarchy W TO bod-
ies, the so-called committees, such as the Antidumping Committee, which meet and often
adopt decisions and recommendations that could be of general applicability, raises the question
whether they themselves have the power to create law.14 Their decisions and recommendations
are not necessarily normative in character in that they do not necessarily purport to regulate any
8 Supra note 6.
9 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, UN Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948).
10 Although a W TO panel has drawn on this provision, see infra note 32 and accompanying text, no panel has
recognized it as source of specific rights and obligations.
11 To my knowledge, no right has ever been added to the sources of WTO law as a result of state practice. The
panel on Mexico-Telecoms, see infra note 32 and accompanying text, used Article XXIX of the GATT to confirm
a meaning that it had reached. It did not point to any state practice whereby a state was behaving in conformity with
this provision because it felt compelled to do so.
12 Supra note 5.
13 W TO adjudicating bodies have never used this term, although, as we will see, they have made references to
acts that could fall within its purview.
14 Wolfgang Benedek appears to have been the first to use the term secondary law to describe a series of consensus-
based decisions by the GATT contracting parties, see WOLFGANG BENEDEK, DAS GATT AUS VÖLKERRECHTLI-
CHER SICHT (1990). In the GATT, references to the “CONTRACTING PARTIES” (all in capitals) refers to the
highest organ; the GATT “CONTRACTING PARTIES” decide, through joint action, all issues coming under the
purview of the GATT. See GATT, supra note 6, Art. XXV.
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particular transactions. But sometimes they do, so the question is: what is the difference, if any,
between their output and that of higher W TO bodies when those convene, for example, under
the auspices of Article IX of the W TO Agreement? What criterion should be used to distin-
guish between acts that could qualify as sources of law and that thereby establish standards to
be applied in other cases, and acts that should not be so considered?
As we will see in more detail in part II, a plausible case can be made in favor of the position
that legislative intent emerges as the criterion that has come to be privileged in W TO case law:
assuming that the framershave entrustedanorgan—whether a committee, theAB,or apanel—
with the legal authority to adopt a particular act that is normative in character, and if the organ
at hand has acted within the predefined parameters of discretion, its act should be accepted as
a source of law. For example, W TO members gave the AB the authority to establish its own
working procedures (DSU Article 17.9). The lawmaking power of the AB is consequently a
reflection of the primary law, since the legislative intent of the framers is, in this respect, unam-
biguous.15
In other situations the framers have not explicitly provided an organ with the power to reg-
ulate specific issues, but unless implied powers are recognized, the organ in question cannot ful-
fill its function. The DSU does not explicitly regulate how to allocate the burden of proof, but
panels and the AB needed to address that issue early in their history.16 In U.S.—Wool Shirts
and Blouses,17 the AB allocated the burden of proof by referring to general principles of law;
unless we recognize that W TO adjudicating bodies possess implied powers to allocate the bur-
den of proof—precisely because of the incompleteness of the DSU in this respect—they will find
it impossible to perform their task. These implied powers arguably stem from DSU Article 11,
which imposes a duty to make an “objective assessment” but does not itself explicitly refer to
issues such as allocating the burden of proof.18
It would be incorrect to infer, however, that any gap-filling exercise is a source of law.19 The
AB’s findings in U.S.—Wool Shirts and Blouses concerning burden of proof were intended to
be normative rather than case-specific: the allocation of burden of proof should not change
based on the identity of the parties. More generally, implied powers should be limited to certain
procedural rights and obligations and should not be extended to substantive rights. Otherwise,
the judge would risk undoing the balance of rights and obligations as agreed by the framers.20
Renegotiation—for example, through amendments, state practice, or the exercise of implied
powers—is another source of WTO law and, by the same token, another way to complete the
15 The AB has used this authority; the latest version of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, W TO Doc.
W T/AB/WP/5, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_e.htm, was published in Jan-
uary 2005.
16 Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in W TO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 499 (2001), was
the first to make this point.
17 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India, W T/DS33/AB/R & corr.1 (adopted May 23, 1997).
18 Gabrielle Marceau, W TO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002), makes a series
of arguments in favor of this approach.
19 A panel might, for example, decide to have an extra internal meeting in light of disagreements among its mem-
bers on a particular issue.
20 The judge should not exceed the boundaries established by DSU Article 11; that is, it should use its implied
powers to ensure that its assessment is objective. It is true, however, that the boundaries are unclear.
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W TO contract.21 Whereas an amendment or state practice (provided it is unanimous)
complete the original contract by adding new obligations (or subtracting from them), the exer-
cise of implied powers aims to fill the gaps—that is, to apply general language (such as “objec-
tive assessment”) from W TO agreements to specific contexts (for example, to allocate the bur-
den of proof). Implied powers cannot be used to undo the balance of rights and obligations,
for W TO organs, which exercise those powers, do not have the power to do that (as is also the
case with W TO “courts,” as per DSU Article 3.2).
The sources of WTO law are often not self-explanatory. W TO adjudicating bodies, which
are requested to interpret them, often need to rely on various interpretative elements in reaching
their conclusions. Whereas defining the sources of law was the privilege of the W TO’s framers,
identifying those interpretative elements is the privilege of the adjudicating bodies. Once
again, when adding such elements, the agents cannot undo the balance of rights and obligations
as struck by the framers.22
Recall that this point is captured by the imperative embedded in DSU Article 3.2: “Rec-
ommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.”23 In order to ensure that these recommendations and rul-
ings will not exceed these bounds, DSU Article 3.2 also specifies the interpretative method that
adjudicating bodies must use: they must reach their interpretations using customary rules of
interpretation. W TO adjudicating bodies have understood this provision to be an implicit ref-
erence to the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).24
That treaty authorizes the use of extra-contractual (extra-W TO in our case) interpretative ele-
ments in order to interpret an international contract. Trachtman emphasizes the distinction
between interpretation and application of law: if, for example, the W TO AB were to use a mul-
tilateral environmental agreement (MEA) to make the point that sea turtles are an exhaustible
natural resource, it should not, according to this distinction, be applying the MEA provision
in a dispute between two W TO members; it should be simply interpreting Article XX(g) of the
GATT, using the MEA as an interpretative element of a term that features in that provision.
This approach is very much in line with the one advocated in the DSU (Article 3.2) and in this
21 Contracts may be incomplete for various reasons. It is difficult, for example, to foresee all future contingencies,
and negotiators might feel that the contract will be best completed through renegotiation or adjudication. In par-
ticular, negotiators might feel that they have reached the point of diminishing returns in the negotiations, so that
too much work will be required to achieve marginally better outcomes. At that point they will stop negotiating and
leave it to subsequent negotiation or adjudication to fill the gaps. For a formal explanation, see Pierpaolo Battigalli
& Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798 (2002); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). For an application in the W TO context, see Joel P. Tra-
chtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333 (1999).
22 This point is not just a matter of semantics. When W TO members felt that W TO adjudicating bodies undid
the balance of rights and obligations that they had negotiated, they reacted strongly. See Petros C. Mavroidis, Ami-
cus Curiae Briefs Before the W TO: Much Ado About Nothing, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLER-
MANN 317 (Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Yves Mény eds., 2004). Mavroidis reports on the W TO
General Council’s special session that was dedicated to a discussion of whether to allow for amici to participate in
W TO proceedings. During that session the majority of WTO members expressed the view that the AB was acting
ultra vires in allowing amici to participate.
23 The DSB, see supra note 2, will not alter the findings of the panel or AB. It will decide to adopt or reject the
findings of a panel/AB report submitted to it as such—that is, without being in a position to modify its findings.
24 May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
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article.25 Through the interpretation of the W TO Agreement, W TO adjudicating bodies
have identified a plethora of interpretative elements. The text box lists the various sources of
law and their interpretative elements as they have emerged in W TO case law.
Finally, it is worth underscoring the separation between the law applicable in W TO adju-
dication and the law applicable, more broadly, to behavior. For example, although jus cogens
does not figure in Appendix 1, all W TO members are bound by it, and specific provisions of
covered agreements implicitly import it. To illustrate the point, GATT Article III requires that,
with respect to domestic regulation affecting trade, W TO members must not discriminate
across domestic and imported like products, but a W TO member that imposes a sales embargo
on racist papers (assuming racist and nonracist papers are considered to be like products, result-
ing in a violation of GATT Article III) might, if challenged, invoke jus cogens under GATT
Article XX.
25 See Trachtman, supra note 21; Joel P. Trachtman, Book Review, 98 AJIL 855 (2002) (reviewing JOOST PAU-
WELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW W TO LAW RELATES TO OTHER
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)).
SOURCES OF LAW AND THEIR INTERPRETATIVE ELEMENTS
Sources of law
Covered agreements DSU Appendix 1
Incorporated international agreements Havana Charter
Agreements referred to in
TRIPS Agreement
SCM Agreement





International agreements to which W TO is a party





Travaux préparatoires of the W TO Agreement
Practice/agreements subsequent to W TO
Agreement
GATT panel reports
W TO panel and AB reports
International agreements not incorporated into
the W TO Agreement
Acts adopted by various international
organizations
Decisions by international courts
Domestic law and practice
Unilateral declarations by W TO members
Customary international law
General principles of law
Doctrine
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II. SOURCES OF LAW APPLICABLE IN W TO ADJUDICATION
The Covered Agreements
Appendix 1 to the DSU includes an exhaustive list of all covered agreements.
International Agreements Incorporated in the Covered Agreements
The texts of several W TO agreements explicitly refer to other international agreements,
which are therefore sources of WTO law.26 They are presented in brief in what follows.
The Havana Charter. Portions of the Havana Charter were incorporated into the GATT
through GATT Article XXIX, but this provision appears to have fallen into desuetude.
Agreements mentioned in the TRIPS Agreement. The agreements mentioned in the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights27 (specifically, Article 1.3) include
major international intellectual property conventions, the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne
Convention (1971), the Rome Convention, and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect
of Integrated Circuits; for example, Article 9 of the TRIPS Agreement requires W TO members
to comply with Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention.
Agreements mentioned in the SCM Agreement. The W TO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures28 provides that government grants of export credits in conformity
with the provisions of the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Cred-
its29 (Arrangement on Guidelines) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) shall not be considered export subsidies. Annex I(k) of the SCM Agreement
states:
[I]f a Member is a party to an international undertaking on official export credits to which
at least twelve original Members to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a
successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original Members), or if in prac-
tice a Member applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export
credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an
export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.
The “international undertaking” described is the OECD Arrangement on Guidelines; by vir-
tue of its incorporation, it is, of course, a source of WTO law.30
Other international agreements. GATT Article XV:6 refers to the obligation of WTO mem-
bers either to become members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or to enter into
a special exchange agreement with the GATT contracting parties. In general, this provision
recognizes a special consultative role for the IMF in case a W TO member wishes to justify its
restrictions on grounds coming under the fund’s competence. This discipline has largely been
overtaken by the agreement between the W TO and the IMF discussed below.
26 The agreements discussed here are not covered agreements, as they do not appear in Appendix 1 to the DSU.
27 See supra note 6.
28 See supra note 6.
29 The arrangement, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/index.htm, was concluded in
1978 and last revised in 1998.
30 The wording of this provision makes it plain that the OECD arrangement applies to the relationship across
W TO members.
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GATT Article XXI and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article XIV bis
reflect the boundaries of the obligations assumed under GATT and GATS, respectively, and
clarify that those obligations are trumped by the obligations that W TO members have
assumed, by virtue of the UN Charter, to safeguard peace and international security.31
The legal relevance of the agreements mentioned in the W TO Agreement. The panel report in
on Mexico—Telecoms32 used Article 46 of the Havana Charter to inform its understanding of
the term “anti-competitive practice.” In so doing that, the panel made it clear that it was using
the relevant provision of the Havana Charter as a supplementary means of interpretation and not
as a source of law applicable in adjudication.
As far as the remaining agreements mentioned in the W TO Agreement are concerned, it
is clear that they apply in the relationships across W TO members. It is less clear whether
amendments to those agreements, which take place outside W TO confines, bind W TO mem-
bers. The panel report in U.S.—Section 110(5) Copyright Act33 made clear that W TO mem-
bers have to observe the incorporated provisions of the Berne Convention: “[T]he substantive
rules of the Berne Convention (1971), including the provisions of its Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii), have become part of the TRIPS Agreement and as provisions of that Agreement have to
be read as applying to W TO Members.” Because they have been incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement, such provisions cannot be modified or amended in a way that has effect within the
W TO system of adjudication, absent a modification or amendment of the TRIPS Agreement
itself.
The panel report in U.S.—Section 110(5) Copyright Act discusses the legal relevance of a
report adopted in connection with, and subsequent to, the conclusion of the 1971 Berne Con-
vention, which, as noted immediately above, is of direct relevance to the interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement. In that case, the panel was asked to interpret the term minor exceptions
appearing in Articles 11(1) and 11 bis (1) of the Berne Convention. The panel noted that par-
ties to the Convention had requested that their general rapporteur review the issue. Though
not inserted as an amendment to the Convention, the rapporteur’s report was adopted by the
contracting parties. The adoption predated the entry into force of the W TO Agreement. The
adoption in itself sufficed for the W TO panel to consider the report as a subsequent agreement
between the parties (to the Berne Convention and not the W TO Agreement) in accordance
with VCLT Article 31(2)(a).
Item (k) of Annex I of the W TO’s SCM Agreement refers to “an international undertaking
on official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this Agreement are parties
as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original Mem-
bers)” (emphasis added): the lack of explicit reference notwithstanding, it has been understood
that the reference in item (k) is to the OECD Arrangement on Guidelines. During the pro-
ceedings that led to the panel report in Brazil—Aircraft (Article 21.5—Second Recourse),34 the
31 On this issue see DAVID LUFF, LE DROIT DE L’ORGANISATION MONDIALE DU COMMERCE: ANALYSE CRI-
TIQUE (2004).
32 Panel Report, Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, para. 7.236, W T/DS204/R
(adopted June 1, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico—Telecoms]. The panel did not request that the defendant behave in
a manner compatible with the Havana Charter; its findings were based on the GATS.
33 Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, para. 6.18, W T/DS160/R (adopted
July 27, 2000) (emphasis added).
34 Panel Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5
of the DSU), paras. 5.80–.91, W T/DS46/RW/2 (adopted Aug. 23, 2001).
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panel faced, inter alia, the following question: to what extent is the relevant text of the OECD
arrangement that of 1992, which is referred to in the SCM Agreement, or that of the 1998,
which was negotiated only among OECD members—that is, among only a small minority of
WTO members? The panel decided that, because of the reference in item (k) to the successor
undertaking, it also had to take into account the 1998 arrangement.35
Even the preparatory work of the incorporated agreements has been of legal relevance in
W TO proceedings: the panel, in its report in Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents,36 took into
account the preparatory work of the Berne Convention to clarify the meaning of a condition
included in a TRIPS provision that it was called on to interpret. In justifying its choice, the panel
noted that the text of the condition in question was clearly drawn from the Berne Convention.
Secondary Law
As already stated above, the W TO Agreement provides for the possibility that the W TO
organs create law. I propose the following classification:
— joint action37 by the W TO membership (interpretations, waivers, amendments)
— decisions and recommendations adopted by W TO organs
— international agreements signed by the W TO
The W TO Agreement provides for the possibility of secondary law but does not specify its
legal value. W TO adjudicating bodies have pronounced on the legal significance of secondary
law: while nominally refusing to accept the lawmaking powers of WTO organs or even to use
the term secondary law, those adjudicating organs have de facto shown substantial deference
toward actions taken collectively by the W TO members, even when such actions were taken
at the lowest level of institutional integration, that of WTO committees.
Joint action. Although this option has never been used, the W TO membership can, by virtue
of Article IX:2 of the W TO Agreement, adopt interpretations of that Agreement—primary
law—by a three-fourths majority, assuming no consensus has been reached. Although the
W TO Agreement does not specifically address the issue of the legal value of such interpreta-
tions, there is reason to believe that they are binding on W TO members and on W TO adju-
dicating bodies. Indeed, as will be shown below, W TO adjudicating bodies have not ques-
tioned the legality of waivers, which are adopted following the same voting procedures as for
interpretations (three-fourths of members);38 this practice suggests that interpretations will
likewise be accepted.
35 The panel cannot be accused of overstepping its mandate. It is, however, remarkable that the W TO mem-
bership agreed in 1994 that a subset of the W TO membership (the OECD members) had the legal right to modify
not only their inter se legal relations, but the rights and obligations of the totality of the W TO membership.
36 Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, para. 7.70, W T/DS114/R (adopted
Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents].
37 This term, which is from the GATT (Article XXV), refers to the decision making by GATT contracting parties.
The term is not formally used in the W TO Agreement; I use it to capture three acts by W TO members acting
jointly: interpretations, amendments, and waivers.
38 In fact, in contrast to the process for seeking interpretations, the process for waivers does not require that one
first look for a consensus. Practice reveals that when three-fourths of the members have cast a favorable vote, a waiver
has been adopted. An interpretation, as a matter of legislative preference, should enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy
for two reasons: by virtue of the higher value attached to the search for consensus, and also because an interpretation
is good law for all W TO members, whereas a waiver is merely a temporary license to disobey the W TO Agreement.
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Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to amendments under Article X of the W TO
Agreement—which amend the covered agreements and are therefore subject to W TO dispute
settlement as parts of those agreements. The provisions of the covered agreements mentioned
in Article X:2 of the W TO Agreement can be amended by consensus or, in the absence of con-
sensus, by various majority rules, depending upon the particular provision in question. On
December 6, 2005, the W TO General Council opened the way for the adoption of the first
(and, so far, only) amendment of the W TO Agreement by consensus.39
Decisions and recommendations by W TO organs. The W TO Agreement does not provide an
exhaustive list of all its organs: Article IV, which reflects the structure of the W TO, does not
explicitly refer to panels, the AB,40 or committees, such as the Antidumping Committee. In
principle, all of the above should qualify as W TO organs since the possibility of establishing
subsidiary bodies is explicitly acknowledged in various parts of this provision (Article IV:3,6),
and they are explicitly mentioned in the relevant W TO agreements. The W TO Agreement
does not specify when W TO organs will issue a decision and when a recommendation, and it
does not even explain the difference between the two.41 These terms are nevertheless reflected
in many working procedures of various W TO committees and are often used in the titles of
adopted acts. We know that they are neither amendments nor interpretations, but we do not
39 The amendment reads as follows:
1. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”)
shall, upon the entry into force of the Protocol pursuant to paragraph 4, be amended as set out in the
Annex to this Protocol, by inserting Article 31bis after Article 31 and by inserting the Annex to the TRIPS
Agreement after Article 73.
2. Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Protocol without the consent
of the other Members.
3. This Protocol shall be open for acceptance by Members until 1 December 2007 or such later date as may
be decided by the Ministerial Conference.
4. This Protocol shall enter into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article X of the W TO Agreement.
5. This Protocol shall be deposited with the Director-General of the World Trade Organization who shall
promptly furnish to each Member a certified copy thereof and a notification of each acceptance thereof
pursuant to paragraph 3.
6. This Protocol shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, W TO Doc. W T/L/641, attachment (Dec. 8,
2005). Through the new Article 31 bis, W TO members, once the amendment has been formally adopted, could
outsource production of goods coming under compulsory licensing. To be sure, the amendment has not (as of this
writing) been formally adopted, which would require, under Article X:3 of the W TO Agreement, a vote of two-
thirds of the W TO members. The period for adoption runs out on December 31, 2009, see W TO Doc. W T/L/711
(Dec. 21, 2007)). Until it has been adopted, a temporary waiver has been granted: already during the launching of
the Doha Round, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, W TO Doc. W T/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
para. 6 (Nov. 20, 2001), incorporated the idea that special care must be taken with respect to developing countries
that cannot meet their public health objectives because of their obligations under TRIPS. The relevant provision was
soon translated into operational language, and through a General Council decision adopted to this effect, W TO
Doc. W T/L/540 & Corr. 1 (Sept. 2, 2003), W TO members accepted that the obligations under TRIPS Article
31(f) should be waived for developing countries. The decision roughly reproduces the idea included in the pending
amendment. The waiver is temporary, however, and its renewal uncertain; legal security will come only with formal
adoption of the amendment.
40 Panels and the AB clearly have no lawmaking power: they can only make recommendations to the DSB.
41 There is one exception: Article IX:4 of the W TO Agreement refers to the decision to grant a waiver.
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know in what precise way they differ from these two. A look into case law offers some guidance
as to their legal status.
I propose first to discuss decisions and recommendations by W TO organs (other than adju-
dicating bodies) and then to shift focus to the decisions by adjudicating bodies that could qual-
ify as secondary law.
In carrying out its responsibilities, the W TO General Council—a non-adjudicative
body—is not limited to acts of a general character, such as the interpretations and amendments
discussed above. Its power to adopt decisions, at the request of a W TO member, is explicitly
mentioned in Article IX:4 of the W TO Agreement: the W TO General Council can adopt
waivers whereby it allows temporary deviations from the W TO Agreement and its annexes.42
Case law has clarified that W TO adjudicating bodies have the right, in turn, to review whether
certain actions taken by W TO members are covered by a waiver or not: during the EC—
Bananas III43 litigation, both the panel and the AB considered the scope of the waiver granted
originally by the GATT General Council, which then extended the waiver to the European
Community (EC) in relation to the Lomé Convention.44 The substantive question before the
panel concerned the precise requirements of the Lomé Convention. The EC and the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries argued that the panel was not competent to answer that
question. Rather, they contended that the panel should defer to the interpretation advanced
by the EC and the ACP—who, as parties to the agreement, were the only legal persons com-
petent to interpret it.45 The panel disagreed. It noted that the EC and the ACP countries ini-
tially had been granted a waiver by the GATT, allowing the preferential treatment granted by
the former to the latter. That waiver was subsequently extended to the EC and ACP countries
through action by the W TO General Council. In the panel’s view, the waiver itself was a
W TO decision that, as such, could be reviewed by a W TO panel. The AB affirmed, observing:
“To determine what is ‘required’ [that is, the scope of the waiver] by the Lomé Convention,
we must look first to the text of that Convention and identify the provisions of it that are rel-
evant to trade in bananas,”46 with the consequence that panels are competent to review whether
actions correspond to the terms and conditions included in waivers authorizing deviations
from the W TO Agreement.
Article IV:5 of the W TO Agreement mentions, in addition to the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council, three other councils (GATT, GATS, TRIPS), and Article IV:6 of the
W TO Agreement makes it clear that these three councils can, when required, establish sub-
sidiary bodies that can and do adopt decisions. Other subsidiary bodies, such as the W TO
Committee on Anti-dumping Practices (ADP Committee), are provided for in the relevant
42 A waiver affects, of course, not only the legal situation of the addressee, but also of the rest of the W TO mem-
bership—which can no longer enforce its rights against the beneficiary, at least to the extent that such enforcement
would contradict the terms of the waiver granted. Even so, and unlike interpretations or amendments, waivers do
not reflect a joint will to change the current legal regime; they serve as a means of satisfying concrete requests by
particular W TO members.
43 Panel Report, EC—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, W T/DS27/R (adopted
Sept. 25, 1997), modified by Appellate Body Report, EC—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, W T DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter EC—Bananas III].
44 The Lomé Conventions were aimed at promoting the economic, social, and cultural development of the con-
tracting parties from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The fourth such convention, 1991 O.J. (L 229) 3, which
was revised in 1995, was signed in Lomé on December 15, 1989.
45 Panel Report, EC—Bananas III, supra note 43, paras. 7.95–.97.
46 Appellate Body Report, EC—Bananas III, supra note 43, para. 169.
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agreements. These organs have decision-making powers. For example, Rule 33 of the working
procedures of the ADP Committee reads: “where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus,
the matter at issue shall be referred to the Council for Trade in Goods.” Not every decision by
each and every W TO organ is of regulatory character. To take just one instance, even a cursory
look at the working procedures of the Antidumping Committee suggests that much of its activ-
ity is not of normative character. But some of it is. For example, the period of investigation
during which a domestic investigating authority must establish dumping and measure injury
is nowhere defined in the Anti-dumping Agreement47 (AD Agreement). The ADP Committee
has filled the gap and recommended the total length for the period of investigation (POI) that
W TO members should use in determining dumping and injury. In light of the committee’s
wide mandate (AD Agreement Article 16),48 it would appear perfectly legitimate for the ADP
Committee to adopt recommendations to this effect.
So what is the legal value of such acts? Over the years, W TO adjudicating bodies have taken
a friendlier attitude toward decisions and recommendations adopted by various W TO organs
(for example, committees). One of the first pronouncements to this effect came with the panel
report in India—Quantitative Restrictions,49 where the panel stated that, if the committee (in
the case at hand, the Committee on Balance of Payments) had already decided the issue before
the panel, it could “see no reason to assume that the panel would not appropriately take those
conclusions into account.” Indeed, the panel indicated that, depending on the treaty language
and the legal powers conferred upon an organ such as the Balance of Payments Committee, it
would potentially be legally compelled to do so. Likewise, the panel report in Mexico—Anti-
dumping Measures on Rice50 relied, in part, on the ADP Committee recommendation on the
length of the POI to support its own view as to the period over which to measure injury (injury
POI). Along the same lines, the panel report in EC—Pipe Fittings51 used a recommendation
by the ADP Committee as a source of law to reach its conclusion that it is desirable that the
period to investigate occurrences of dumping (dumping POI) substantially overlap with injury
POI. Likewise, the panel in Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties52 relied on this recom-
mendation by the ADP Committee to support its conclusion that the dumping and injury
POIs should not necessarily end at the same time.
Note that the panel report in India—Quantitative Restrictions was dealing with a decision
by a committee, whereas the other reports mentioned dealt with recommendations. As things
47 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15,
1994, W TO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1A, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 5, at 168 [hereinafter AD
Agreement].
48 See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
49 Panel Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products,
paras. 5.93–94, W T/DS90/R (adopted Sept. 22, 1999); Appellate Body Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, W T/DS90/AB/R (adopted Sept. 22, 1999).
50 Panel Report, Mexico—Definitive Anti-dumping Measure on Rice, para. 7.62, W T/DS295/R (adopted Dec.
20, 2005), modified by Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Definitive Anti-dumping Measure on Rice, W T/DS295/
AB/R (adopted Dec. 20, 2005).
51 Panel Report, EC—Anti-dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, para.
7.321, W T/DS219/R (adopted Aug. 18, 2003), modified by Appellate Body Report, EC—Anti-dumping Duties
on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, W T/DS219/AB/R (adopted Aug. 18, 2003) [hereinafter
EC—Pipe Fittings].
52 Panel Report, Argentina—Definitive Anti-dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, para. 7.287,
W T/DS241/R (adopted May 19, 2003) [hereinafter Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties].
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stand, especially in the field of contingent-protection instruments, where practice has been
substantial, W TO adjudicating bodies seem to treat recommendations by W TO organs as
supplementary means of interpretation (as when prefacing recourse to them with the such phrases
as “we find support” or “our interpretation is confirmed”).
Is such a classification inappropriate? It is true that a recommendation by the ADP Com-
mittee is not an interpretation: Article IX:2 of the W TO Agreement reserves the exclusive
authority to adopt interpretations to two organs, the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council. Article 16.1 of the AD Agreement, however, does not preclude the ADP Committee
from exercising regulatory functions. Indeed, its mandate as specified in that article is quite
open ended: it “shall carry out responsibilities as assigned to it under this Agreement or by the
Members.” In principle, nothing stops W TO members from delegating regulatory authority
at this level. A recommendation like the one on the length of the POI could, for example, serve
as a source of law. It dealt for the first time at the multilateral level with an issue not explicitly
regulated in the AD Agreement; it used language that makes it clear that it was intended to serve
as a guideline; and it was accepted by consensus.
A very strong counterargument can be made, however, that—in my view, at least—ulti-
mately justifies the choice of WTO adjudicating bodies to treat such recommendations as sup-
plementary means of interpretation and not as sources of law. The General Council has a quo-
rum provision: Rule 16 of its working procedures specifically states that the majority of the
W TO membership must be present for a quorum.53 There is no quorum requirement for any
of the committees established under the various covered agreements. This difference cannot
be accidental. The will of the legislator must have been to associate the General Council meet-
ings with a certain degree of formal significance, whereas the reverse is true for committee meet-
ings.54 By the same token, the expectation of trade delegates to the W TO must be that “serious”
issues will be discussed at the General Council–level, whereas more day-to-day operations will
form the subject matter of the committee mandates. Practice in the ADP, but also in other com-
mittees, amply supports this view. The recommendation concerning POIs is an exception to
the items on typical agenda; normally, delegates will discuss complaints by members, imple-
mentation of panel reports, and so on. Similarly, other committees, such as the Committee on
Trade and Environment, will entertain discussions on what is an environmental good or what
should be the link between a multilateral environmental agreement and the W TO. The com-
mittee will stop short, however, of deciding the issue. This last step is left for higher organs,
assuming a consensus has been reached.
The context of a decision or recommendation—that is, the organ adopting it—seems to be
an important consideration in the W TO, which supports the view that recommendations such
as the one concerning POIs were correctly treated by the panel as supplementary means and
not as a source of law. This solution also has the merit of flexibility: for example, if W TO mem-
bers are interesting in elevating the POI recommendation to a source of law, nothing stops
them from including it in the new AD agreement or from adopting an interpretation to that
effect.55
53 See W TO Doc. W T/L/28 (Feb. 7, 1996) (on file with author).
54 There is no official data, but only anecdotal evidence, that General Council meetings attract more delegates
than committee meetings do.
55 Some might object, arguing that the quorum requirement is a thin reed to support a distinction with such
far-reaching implications. Recall, nonetheless, that the heart of this argument concerns the expectations of WTO
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Note, finally, that one panel has even reviewed the relevance of an act by a non-standing (that
is, ad hoc or nonpermanent) W TO organ, albeit as a supplementary means. In its determi-
nation that the term “anti-competitive practice” covered horizontal price fixing, the April 2004
panel report in Mexico—Telecoms56 relied, in part, on the work of the W TO Working Party
on the Interaction of Trade and Competition Policies, which the panel found to be of some
relevance. This working party was created by the Singapore Ministerial Conference of 1996
and had not met since September 2003, following the decision by negotiators not to renew its
mandate. Although the panel issued no explicit pronouncement to this effect, the context
makes obvious that the panel treated the W TO working party report as a supplementary means
of interpretation; that is, the panel referred to the working party’s work in order to confirm a
conclusion that the panel had already reached (as per Article 32 of the VCLT). This way of
proceeding is correct; nothing in the W TO Agreement or its annexes or in the working pro-
cedures of this working group can be advanced as an argument in favor of treating an inter-
mediate result57 as a source of law.
Having concluded that the decisions and recommendation of non-adjudicative W TO
organs do not quality as sources of law, we now turn to the work of adjudicative bodies.
The DSU, one of the covered agreements, explicitly acknowledges the right of WTO adju-
dicating bodies to establish their own working procedures. DSU Article 17.9 explicitly autho-
rizes the AB to do so (which it has done). Although panels are, in principle, required to obey
the working procedures in Appendix 3 to the DSU, Article 12.1 of that agreement permits them
to deviate if they so choose. The primary law thus acknowledges the right of WTO adjudicating
bodies (albeit not the same for all bodies) to legislate in the narrow context of their own procedures.
In addition to the power to enact procedures, W TO adjudicating bodies have on occasion
created law in order to be in a position to honor their mandates—that is, to resolve the disputes
before them. We took the position above that, unless one accepts that adjudicating bodies are
vested with implied powers, it will sometimes be impossible for them to honor their mandate.
We offered the example of allocating the burden of proof as evidence of such implied powers.
But there are other examples as well: third party rights is an appropriate illustration.58 Appen-
dix 3 does not mention extended third-party rights. When the first panel decided on extending
the right of third parties so as to allow them to participate in the second substantive panel meet-
ing,59 the panel had to establish criteria60 to which future interested parties could refer in order
members in connection with introducing an issue in a lower, not higher, organ. Lower committees sometimes meet
with only a few delegates present, with the consequence that the majority of delegations learn about their decisions
much later.
56 Panel Report, Mexico—Telecoms, supra note 32, para. 7.236.
57 As briefly alluded to above, the Working Party on the interaction of Trade and Competition policies was not
brought to a successful conclusion. Following the failure to agree in Cancun (midterm review of the Doha round),
the W TO membership decided to discontinue its mandate. In the meantime, nevertheless, the working party man-
aged to produce an impressive amount of work regarding the merits of competition policy as a complement to free
trade policies.
58 See DSU Art. 10. Essentially, W TO members can participate in the first panel meeting if they declare their
wish to do so within the statutory deadlines.
59 Third parties do not enjoy this right. DSU App. 3, para. 6.
60 Essentially, the panel would first satisfy itself that a third party had an especially strong reason for continuing
to participate in a given dispute. The question of enhanced third party rights first arose in EC—Bananas III, when
a number of developing-country third parties requested that they be permitted to attend all meetings between the
panel and the parties to the dispute—and not simply the first meeting as per DSU Article 10.3. Panel Report,
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to enjoy the same privilege. Yet another example concerns the participation of amici curiae.
Nothing in Appendix 3 provides for such participation, the conditions for which61 have been
defined, instead, via the case law of the AB and panels.62
International Agreements Signed by the W TO
The W TO Agreement falls short of explicitly granting a treaty-making power to the W TO;
the combination of various provisions nevertheless leads us to this conclusion. In particular,
Article VIII:1 acknowledges that the W TO has legal personality; Article V states that the
W TO General Council63 can make arrangements that will facilitate the cooperation between
the W TO and institutions having a related mandate; and Article III:5 explicitly provides for
cooperation between the W TO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
The W TO has, in fact, signed international agreements. Two of them involve, as expected,
the Bretton Woods institutions—the agreement between the International Monetary Fund
and the World Trade Organization, and the agreement between the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the
World Trade Organization.64 These agreements, which were approved by the W TO General
Council at its meeting on November 7, 8, and 13, 1996,65 were intended to strengthen the
W TO’s relationship with IMF and the World Bank. The W TO has concluded two more
agreements: one with the World Intellectual Property Organization66 and one with the World
Organization for Animal Health (formerly the Office International des Epizooties).67
The relevance of such agreements has already been acknowledged in case law: the AB, in its
report in Argentina—Textiles and Apparel,68 held that the agreement between the W TO and
the IMF is legally relevant but that it does not modify, add to, or diminish the rights and obli-
gations of members under the W TO Agreement. The agreements in questions are conse-
quently not covered agreements in the sense of Appendix 1 to the DSU.
The Treatment of Customary International Law in W TO
Before we move to review the interpretative elements for W TO law, a few words on the
treatment of customary law warranted. One W TO panel has discussed at length the relevance
of customary international law in the W TO legal context, and in light of this report, we are
EC—Bananas III, supra note 43, para. 7.4. Given that the export revenue for numerous developing countries risked
being heavily affected by the outcome of the dispute, the panel agreed to the request. Id., paras. 7.8, .9.
61 See Mavroidis, supra note 22, for a detailed account of the amici participation saga and the current conditions
for participation.
62 See Bartels, supra note 16.
63 As per Article IV:2 of the W TO Agreement, the General Council can exercise the functions of the Ministerial
Conference, the highest organ in the W TO institutional setting, when the latter does not meet.
64 General Council Decision, Agreements Between the W TO the IMF and the World Bank, W TO Doc.
W T/L/195 (Nov. 18, 1996).
65 The legal basis for these agreements is Article III:5 of the W TO Agreement.
66 35 ILM 754 (1996).
67 W TO Doc. W T/L/272 ( July 8, 1998).
68 Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, para.
72, W T/DS56/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998), modified by Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting
Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, W T/DS56/AB/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998).
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compelled to devote some paragraphs to the issue. Numerous other reports have made exten-
sive reference to general principles of law that are not referenced in the VCLT. These reports
will be discussed in a separate subsection.
Customary international law plays a specific role in W TO dispute settlement by virtue of
DSU Article 3.2, which specifies that the purpose of dispute settlement is to clarify the pro-
visions of the W TO Agreement “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of pub-
lic international law.”
The 2000 panel report in Korea—Procurement69 discussed the relevance of customary inter-
national law (other than treaty interpretation) to the W TO legal order. In particular, this
report examined the concept of nonviolation complaints70 in the light of customary interna-
tional law—and more specifically, in relation to pacta sunt servanda.
Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between the
W TO Members. Such international law applies to the extent that the W TO treaty agree-
ments do not “contract out” from it. To put it in another way, to the extent that there is
no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered W TO agreement that implies
differently, we are of the view that the customary rules of international law apply to the
W TO treaties and to the process of treaty formation under the W TO.
With this very important statement, the panel report suggests that general customary inter-
national law is always relevant unless the covered agreements have explicitly contracted out from
it. The natural consequence would be that, since the content of customary international law
contains elements additional to W TO contractual rights and obligations, the covered agree-
ments and the incorporated agreements are not exclusive sources of law applicable in W TO
adjudication; customary international law must also be considered a source of WTO law.
Statements such as those in Korea—Procurement have never been repeated in subsequent
case law. Nevertheless, the report’s potential use for extending the sources of WTO law to cover
customary international law should not be exaggerated: a context-specific reading of this panel
report suggests that its findings were not made with respect to an autonomous source of law
(à la Higgins),71 but with respect to a general principle that has attained the status of customary
international law.
Even without its being specifically addressed in the case law, the overall relevance of custom-
ary international law in the W TO legal order has continued to be an active topic in the legal
literature. Pauwelyn,72 for example, makes the case in favor of constructing W TO law as a part
of the whole—with the whole being public international law. If such an approach entails using
interpretative elements from the wider public international law, then few would argue with it.
69 Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, para. 7.96, W T/DS163/R (adopted
June 19, 2000) [hereinafter Korea—Procurement].
70 Through this instrument, trading nations might be compelled to compensate their (negatively) affected trad-
ing partners, even though they have committed no illegality. The leading example is compensation for (external
negative) effects of subsidization: domestic subsidies are not illegal in the W TO legal order, but a nation that sub-
sidizes, say, tomatoes after it has agreed to reduce its import duty on this product, is harming the foreign producer
who might legitimately not have expected this subsidy. Compensation in such a case is necessary, not only in order
to protect the bona fides trading partner who negotiated the ten percent concession, but also because the system
wants thus to ensure that the incentive to negotiate further trade liberalization will not be put into question by such
(legal) acts.
71 See HIGGINS, supra note 7.
72 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICTS OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
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If, however, the suggestion is that by referring to customary international law, we are looking
for autonomous sources of law additional to the covered (and the incorporated) agreements,
then the discussion become tricky, at least within W TO dispute settlement. A primary prob-
lem concerns the identification of the relevant customary international law: which customary inter-
national law is relevant? To respond to this question, we need a precise definition of the customary
international law (other than jus cogens, of course) that binds all 153 W TO members.73
Some of that customary international law has been codified: the VCLT, the UN General
Assembly resolution on state responsibility,74 and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea.75 The last of these could be relevant for the discussion of rules of origin, though at this stage
there is nothing like a substantive agreement on rules of origin in the W TO.
The General Assembly resolution on state responsibility has been referred to in some W TO
disputes and, in extenso, in the arbitrator’s report in U.S.—FSC (Article 22.6—U.S.).76 It was
referred to as supplementary means supporting the interpretative decision on remedies, and not
as an autonomous source of law.77 The resolution in question codifies customary international
law in the field of state responsibility and is the product of an effort extending over five
decades.78 The International Law Commission’s report clarifies numerous issues that were left
unspecified in the DSU: for example, retroactive remedies—in the sense that damages will be
calculated from the point in time when the illegality was committed—are customary interna-
tional law, and so is the calculation of both damnum emergens (damage already suffered) and
lucrum cessans (expectation value, forgone gains) as part of the compensation due in case of
breach of contract.
Nothing, of course, stops the W TO membership from explicitly deviating from customary law
(other than jus cogens). Indeed, since custom and treaty are of equal value, it is the lex posterior prin-
ciple that will determine which law takes precedence.79 Nevertheless, although the DSU is highly
73 The current list of members and the dates that they joined the organization can be found at http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
74 General Assembly Resolution 56/83 adopted the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
75 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, reprinted in 21
ILM 1261 (1982).
76 Arbitration Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” Recourse by Article
22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement by EC, W T/DS108/ARB (adopted Aug. 30, 2002) [here-
inafter U.S.—FSC].
77 Recall our discussion of HIGGINS, see supra note 7, and the point made there that general principles of law serve
the purpose of interpreting other sources of law rather than creating autonomous rights and obligations. Admittedly,
the arbitrator’s reference to the General Assembly resolution in U.S.—FSC is cryptic and could lend support to those
taking the view that the reference to the resolution was in the context of VCLT Article 31; that is, the arbitrator
considered the resolution to be a relevant rule of public international law, or context to the W TO, and for this reason
recourse to it was compulsory. My own view, however, is that the majority of the references to the resolution simply
confirm the conclusion that the arbitrator had already reached about the remedy to recommend in the case; that
is, the arbitrator first decided (without reference to the resolution) what remedy to recommend, and then justified
that choice by referring to the resolution. If anything, the resolution was used as supplementary means of inter-
pretation, as per VCLT Article 32.
78 Various jurisdictions around the world have repeatedly acknowledged the customary nature of the obligations
contained therein.
79 The General Assembly resolution was passed after the DSU, so it could be argued that it is lex posterior to it.
However, it only declares what seems to have been the customary standard for compensation for many years before
the enactment of the DSU (see, for example, the judgment of the Permanent of International judgment in Factory
at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13). In this vein, the DSU did not deviate from prior
customary international law.
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incomplete—in the sense that it does not address all the issues addressed in the General Assembly
resolution on state responsibility—the DSU does not explicitly deviate from the resolution.
DSU Article 19, the overarching provision, indicates that panels will recommend that par-
ties bring their measures into compliance, when appropriate, but will not prescribe particular
courses of action. DSU Article 22.4, as well as SCM Article 4.10,80 which deal with the cal-
culation of damages, reflect the proportionality principle—the essence of the calculation of
damages in the General Assembly resolution. Consequently, as to the basic principle, there is
symmetry across the W TO agreements and the General Assembly resolution. The W TO legal
framework does not address any other questions regarding the calculation of damages. Those
matters were left to practice.
W TO practice suggests that, contrary to what is the case in customary international law,
damages will be calculated from the end of the implementation period and not from the earlier
moment when the illegality occurred. In the GATT years, there was no provision correspond-
ing to DSU Article 19: Petersmann81 identifies only five cases where retroactive remedies were
recommended (5 out of over 120 cases, in which, by Hudec’s counting, the complaining parties
prevailed in the majority of cases).82 W TO practice lends further support to the argument that
remedies in the W TO legal system are de facto of prospective nature only.83
At the end of the day the question is: how should the legislative silence in DSU Article 19
be understood? The W TO will, by virtue of Article XVI of the W TO Agreement, be guided
by GATT practice. When turning to GATT practice, panels have found a mixed record: as
noted above, a few reports embraced retroactivity, but most did not. This record could raise
legitimate doubts as to the continuing relevance of retroactivity in the W TO era. Risk-averse
agents have comfortably sought refuge in the less intrusive (as far as national sovereignty is con-
cerned) mode of calculating damages.84 GATT/W TO practice thus lends support to the
80 The linguistic differences between the two provisions suggest that damages will be calculated in a slightly more
generous manner under the SCM Agreement. Both provisions stick to proportionality, however, and a footnote to
SCM Article 4.10 explicitly states that no recourse to disproportionate countermeasures is permissible under that
article. See Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the W TO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 763 (2000).
81 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System,
35 J. WORLD TRADE 27 (1993).
82 ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1993). It is probably a quixotic test to try
to explain why this practice has emerged, since so many explanatory variables are potentially at work. It seems to
me, however, that the composition of panels is largely responsible. There are two important consequences of the
selection process for the panelists, who were usually delegates in Geneva and agreed by the parties. First, they were
likely to be sensitive to the parties own preferences and interests, and the parties generally have a common incentive
not to “rock the boat” in view of the uncertainty as to who will commit illegalities in the future and potentially be
subject to subject to retroactive damages. Second, since the panelists were not necessarily professional lawyers, they
were not trained to think of remedies as involving an effort to restore the status quo ante. With regard to this latter
point, there is a correlation between the establishment of a GATT legal office (with trained lawyers) (1982, in
Hudec’s (1993) narrative, supra) and the beginning of recommendations for retroactive remedies.
83 With one exception only, panels and arbitrators (operating under DSU Article 22.6) alike have recommended
prospective action. Regrettably so, I believe, on both doctrinal grounds, as mentioned here, and from a policy per-
spective since such remedies substantially undermine the incentive to comply. Having stated that, one should prob-
ably keep in mind that the AB has so far had no opportunity to pronounce on this score.
84 As noted above, if providing an incentive to comply is the paramount consideration, then remedies should be ret-
roactive. In Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements (2001), at http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/files/wp/
WEB-blaa-2001-14.pdf, however, Wilfried Ethier has taken the view that, in light of the uncertainty as to who will
be the winner in dispute adjudication, the common incentive of the membership is to opt for weak, rather than strong,
remedies. This reinforces the point made above, see supra note 82, concerning the selection of panelists.
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argument that customary international law has not been followed in the W TO on this par-
ticular issue of damages—an outcome with which the majority of WTO membership seems
at ease.85
Moving away from codified customary law presents us with important evidentiary issues.
Take for example, the precautionary principle, which has been codified in some treaties. The
panel report in EC—Hormones86 held the view that, assuming arguendo that the precautionary
principle is customary international law, it would not override explicit provisions of the cov-
ered agreements that were intended to codify it. This conclusion was affirmed by the AB, which
noted that the status of the precautionary principle in international law is still very much the
subject of debate. The AB also stated that while the precautionary principle might have crys-
tallized into a general principle of customary international environmental law, it is less than
clear whether it has been widely accepted as a principle of general or customary international
law. At the same time, whether or not the precautionary principle might have that status, the
AB ended up stressing its relevance in the interpretation of WTO norms.
More generally, W TO case law has not further clarified issues left unanswered by Korea—
Procurement concerning the role of customary law in W TO adjudication.87 Note however,
that over 200 reports in the W TO era and over 120 panel reports in the GATT era did not
identify any custom other than good faith as a source of GATT/W TO law. If there were such
sources of law relevant to GATT/W TO adjudication, one would expect that in the sixty years of
multilateral trade relations that gave birth to hundreds of court (panel) proceedings, arguments
invoking such law would surely have been advanced by the interested parties. They were not.
General Principles of Law in the W TO Legal Order
The nature of general principles.88 The panel report in EC—Pipe Fittings89 held that a gen-
eral principle of law, by its very nature, cannot substitute for a detailed contractual provision.
We are conscious that the requirement in Article 3.1 to conduct an “objective examina-
tion” on the basis of “positive evidence” is that the investigating authorities examination
85 To avoid any misunderstandings, I am not describing here the law as it should be, but rather as it is.
86 Panel Report, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), W T/DS26/R/USA
(adopted Feb. 13, 1998), modified by Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), paras. 120–25, W T/DS26/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) (reported by David A. Wirth at 92 AJIL
755 (1998)) [hereinafter EC—Hormones].
87 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. It is difficult to state how much the W TO legal regime has missed
out so far as a result of this attitude. In Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 85 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe
Hirsch eds., 2004), Eyal Benvenisti points to the possibility of using customary international law to promote more
efficient equilibria among those participating. One important condition in his scheme however, concerns the role
of the judge. Without advocating a judge akin to Dworkin’s Hercules, he, too, envisages a well informed and alert
judge. To my mind—and for institutional reasons, since panelists are ad hoc and AB members part timers)—much
remains to be done in this context before we can reap similar benefits in the W TO. I will return to this issue later.
88 It was difficult to decide whether general principles of law should be treated here, under sources of law appli-
cable in W TO adjudication, rather than in part III, where we discuss interpretative elements. Some of the general
principles mentioned here do interpret the sources of law. For example, in dubio mitius amounts to a presumption
that no sovereignty has been transferred when the letter of the law is unclear. But some general principles do not
have this function. For example, estoppel and res judicata do not interpret rules of law; instead, they limit the com-
petence of an adjudicating body to decide certain questions. It is the heterogeneity of general principles of law that
persuaded me that they should be discussed here as a separate category of law applicable in W TO adjudication.
89 Panel Report, EC—Pipe Fittings, supra note 51, para. 7.292.
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conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. The
investigating authority must therefore ensure an even-handed treatment of the informa-
tion and data on the record of the investigation.90
This passage reflects, in a general manner, the attitude of WTO adjudicating bodies toward
general principles of law. The panel used such general principles in order to interpret the
requirement of an “objective examination.” In what follows, I identify the general principles
that have been acknowledged as legally relevant in the W TO legal order.
Estoppel. The first comprehensive discussion of estoppel appeared in the GATT panel report
in U.S.—Softwood Lumber II.91 In that case, the parties to the dispute (Canada, United States)
had concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU), and the question, inter alia, before
the panel concerned the extent to which the parties, by signing the MOU, had waived their
rights under the GATT and were thus estopped from any further action. Although the panel
discusses this question in extenso in its report, it refrained from deciding the issue in light of the
dispute’s particular factual setting. Because of the panel’s extended discussion of this issue,
however, it is reasonable to infer that the panel was saw the principle of estoppel as having some
relevance within the GATT legal framework.
Since that time, several W TO panels have discussed estoppel. No consistent view emerges
from the case law, however; the legal relevance has depended on various factors, ranging from
the subject matter of the particular case to the evidence relating to the behavior of the W TO
member allegedly bound by the estoppel. The first discussion can be found in the 2000 panel
report in Guatemala—Cement II.92 After the AB rejected Mexico’s initial complaint, Mexico
introduced a new complaint against the same practice. At that point Guatemala argued that
Mexico was estopped from pursuing that new complaint. The panel disagreed, reasoning that
the estoppel principle is relevant, only if the complaining party had clearly consented to the
particular behavior in question, which Mexico had not.93
Along the same lines, the 2003 panel report in Argentina—Poultry Antidumping Duties94
reviewed the estoppel principle as a source restraining its jurisdiction. In concreto, Argentina
argued that Brazil was estopped from submitting the instant dispute to a W TO panel since the
very same dispute had already been adjudicated by a MERCOSUR panel (the regional inte-
gration scheme in which both Argentina and Brazil participate). The W TO panel dismissed
Argentina’s argument because, inter alia, in its view DSU Article 3.2 did not require panels to
rule in any particular way and thus to conform their own decisions to those by other adjudi-
cating forums. The panel did accept, however, the parameters of the estoppel principle as pre-
sented by Argentina—in particular, that estoppel applied in circumstances where one party
makes a statement that is clear and unambiguous, voluntary, unconditional, authorized, and
relied on by the other party in good faith.
90 I understand that reference to “basic principles” is tantamount to general principles of law.
91 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, paras. 308–25,
SCM/162 (adopted Oct. 27, 1993).
92 Panel Report, Guatemala—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico,
paras. 823, 824 & n.791, W T/DS156/R (adopted Nov. 17, 2000).
93 To be sure, Guatemala was effectively arguing ne bis in idem. “Estoppel” is a different concept: it can be the
consequence of ne bis in idem, but it is also relevant in circumstances other than ne bis in idem as well. For example,
in the ICJ’s Nuclear Tests cases (Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ REP. 253 & 457 (Dec. 20), estoppel is the con-
sequence of a unilateral declaration to stop nuclear tests, and not of a prior court decision or arbitration.
94 Panel Report, Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties, supra note 52, paras. 7.37, .38.
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More recently, the AB, in its 2005 report in EC—Export Subsidies on Sugar,95 had the oppor-
tunity to present its views on estoppel. Noting that it had never applied this principle, it took
the view that if relevant at all, the principle had been narrowed down to DSU Articles 3.7 and
3.10, which require W TO members to exercise their judgment as to the fruitfulness of sub-
mitting a dispute. This analysis by the AB, however, has nothing to do with the estoppel prin-
ciple as it is known in public international law. The two DSU articles in question are concep-
tualized in terms of cost-benefit analysis, which would probably not be justiciable. By contrast,
estoppel within public international law is conceived as an obstacle to submitting a claim, irre-
spective of the outcome of any possible cost-benefit analysis by the potential claimant. Follow-
ing the AB’s decision in EC—Export Subsidies on Sugar, it seems safe to conclude that, as things
stand, the estoppel principle, as we know it in public international law, has no current place
in the W TO legal regime.96
Res judicata.The panel report in India—Autos97 discussed res judicata extensively, holding
that the principle has its place in the W TO legal order. This panel made it clear that there are
stringent conditions attached to this principle; absent their satisfaction, it cannot be applied:
1. the measures challenged in the original and the subsequent disputes must be iden-
tical
2. the claims in the two disputes must be identical
3. the parties in the two disputes must be identical
If these three conditions are cumulatively met, then res judicata comes into play. No subse-
quent case, however, has applied the legal benchmark established through India—Autos. That
benchmark is, it should be said, largely consonant with the understanding of this principle in
public international law.98
Error. The panel report in Korea—Procurement99 is the only report that contains a compre-
hensive discussion of error. In that case the United States claimed that an error on its part had
the effect of vitiating its consent to be bound by the terms of the agreement. The issue before
the panel concerned the extent to which a Korean entity was obligated to abide by the disci-
plines of the W TO Agreement on Government Procurement.100 The panel discussed whether
the error at hand was of such a nature as to accept the U.S. claim that it should not be considered
to have given its consent. The panel concluded that the United States had itself contributed
95 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Export Subsidies on Sugar, W T/DS265/AB/R,
W T/DS266/AB/R, & W T/DS283/AB/R (adopted May 19, 2005) [hereinafter EC—Export Subsidies on Sugar].
96 Note that in similar cases ICJ practice shows that unilateral declarations have been acknowledged the force of
estoppel, thereby making it impossible for the declaring states to exercise the rights that they promised not exercise.
See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor), 1933 PCIJ Series A/B, no. 53, at 71 (Apr. 5) (discussing Ihlen
Declaration); Nuclear Tests.
97 Panel Report, India—Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, paras. 7.54–.66, W T/DS146/R,
W T/DS175/R & corr.1 (adopted Apr. 5, 2002).
98 The difference between res judicata and estoppel is as follows: in the former, the forum is the same (in the
original and the subsequent litigation), whereas in the latter, the forums are different, so that a country might be
estopped from submitting a complaint before a particular forum because a different forum has already pronounced
on the issue.
99 Panel Report, Korea—Procurement, supra note 69, paras. 7.123–.126.
100 April 15, 1994, W TO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 4B, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 5.
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to the error and was therefore obligated to carry out the contractual terms (that is, the error was
not excusable). The panel’s entire analysis is predicated on its understanding and interpretation
of VCLT Article 48.101
Non adimplenti contractus.102 In Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties103 Argentina
argued, inter alia, that other W TO members had been practicing what Argentina was being
accused of, but without being punished. Argentina was arguing, in effect, that it should not
be punished since others were also not respecting the relevant portion of the W TO contract.
The panel responded that the dispute before it concerned only Argentina’s practices:
Argentina asserts that the methodology used by the [Department of Unfair Trading
Practices and Safeguards] has also been used by other W TO Members. Even assuming for
the sake of argument that Argentina is correct, this argument is nevertheless irrelevant. In
this dispute, we must determine the conformity of Argentina’s methodology (and not that
of other W TO Members) in light of the relevant provisions of the [Anti-dumping] Agree-
ment.
As a result, Argentina could not invoke non adimplenti contractus as a source restraining the
panel’s jurisdiction.
Good faith (bona fides). Numerous reports refer to the obligation to perform the W TO treaty
in good faith, as is also stipulated in VCLT Article 26 (pacta sunt servanda). What exactly this
obligation entails has nevertheless been discussed only on a few occasions: the panel report in
Korea—Procurement104 contains reference to the good faith (bona fides) principle as one of
public international law that must be taken into account by W TO adjudicating bodies.
There is some case law concerning the connection between violations of the W TO Agree-
ment and the principle of good faith. Consider, for example, the panel report in EC—Pipe Fit-
tings,105 where the panel took the defendant to be acting in good faith even though some con-
fidential information was not submitted to the panel, and the reason for not submitting such
information was judged unsatisfactory by the panel itself. Similarly, in U.S.—Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment),106 the AB asserted that a mere violation of a provision of a W TO Agreement
does not in and of itself amount to a violation of the principle of good faith. So far, no W TO
case law has suggested that a member may have acted in bad faith.
In dubio mitius. The dubio mitius principle has been invoked in more than one case, the lead-
ing one being the EC—Hormones AB report.107 There, the AB reversed the panel’s understand-
ing concerning the allocation of the burden of proof when a W TO member deviates from an
international standard (of those mentioned in the SPS Agreement). Contrary to what the panel
101 A word of caution is warranted here. This panel is idiosyncratic, an outlier: no other panel has shown so much
deference toward customary law. The ad hoc selection process of panelists enables such outcomes. The assistance
that the W TO secretariat provides to panels is a means of ensuring that such deviations from “orthodoxy” will not
be frequent.
102 By virtue of this principle, a promisee can lawfully breach its promise if the promisor has neglected its own.
103 Panel Report, Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties, supra note 52, para. 7.79.
104 Panel Report, Korea—Procurement, supra note 69.
105 Panel Report, EC—Pipe Fittings, supra note 51, para. 7.307.
106 Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, para. 298,
W T/DS217/AB/R, W T/DS234/AB/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2003) (reported by Mark L. Movsesian at 98 AJIL 150
(2004)) [hereinafter U.S.—Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)].
107 Appellate Body Report, EC—Hormones, supra note 86, paras. 154, 165.
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had held, the AB took the view that an adjudicating body cannot simply assume that, in pres-
ence of two possible readings of the same provisions, W TO members opted for the relatively
more onerous of the two. The AB based its conclusion on the maxim in dubio mitius:
We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the
more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation by mandating conformity or
compliance with such standards, guidelines and recommendations. To sustain such an
assumption and to warrant such a far-reaching interpretation, treaty language far more
specific and compelling than that found in Article 3 of the SPS Agreement would be nec-
essary.
Citing numerous public international law books and articles that discuss the principle in dubio
mitius, the AB also noted that the “interpretative principle of in dubio mitius, [is] widely rec-
ognized in international law as a ‘supplementary means of interpretation.’” Thus, this case
opens the W TO door to in dubio mitius and also, at the same time, clarifies that it is to be con-
sidered a supplementary means of interpretation.
In a nutshell, in W TO adjudication, general principles of law have been used extensively,
though in most cases as interpretative elements for the sources of WTO law. In theory—but
as yet, not in practice—general principles can be used as factors limiting a complainant’s right
to relief. In Korea—Procurement, the complainant was, in fact, refused relief because of a vio-
lation of a general principle of law, but that was the only such case. It has proved to be an outlier
whose approach to public international law has not been taken up in subsequent cases.
III. INTERPRETATIVE ELEMENTS
In this part I have two objectives: (1) to lay out the process for identifying interpretative ele-
ments for the W TO Agreement and its covered agreements, and (2) to show that, because
W TO adjudicating bodies are not free to choose their mode of interpretation but must abide
by customary international law in this respect,108 the identification process itself also deter-
mines the legal value of the various interpretative elements used.
We begin off our discussion by explaining the interpretative constraint109 imposed on the
W TO adjudicating bodies.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Enters the W TO
DSU Article 1 states: “The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to dis-
putes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agree-
ments listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the ‘cov-
ered agreements’).”
When adjudicating a dispute between two W TO members, a W TO adjudicating body will
essentially be requested to complete the contract by providing dispute-specific information. The
108 Contrary to the ICJ, W TO adjudicating bodies cannot judge ex aequo et bono.
109 DSU Article 3.2 not explicitly refer to the VCLT. The AB understood the reference to customary rules of
interpretation to imply reference to VCLT.
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terms of reference (TOR) for dispute-adjudication are enshrined in DSU Article 7:110 “To exam-
ine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the
parties to the dispute), the matter . . . .”
When called to adjudicate, a W TO adjudicating body is not free to choose any legal inter-
pretation that it deems appropriate. It must interpret the covered agreements by observing the
discipline embedded in DSU Article 3.2, which reads in full:
The dispute settlement system of the W TO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves
to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB can-
not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
The AB, in the first case before it—U.S.—Gasoline111 —held that all covered agreements are
part of one agreement, the W TO Agreement, and it also understood the reference to custom-
ary rules of interpretation of public international law to correspond to the rules contained in
the VCLT.
VCLT Article 31 mentions that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with (1) the ordi-
nary meaning of its terms (2) in their context, taking into account (3) the object and the purpose
of the treaty, (4) relevant subsequent practice, (5) subsequent agreements on the same subject mat-
ter, and (6) any relevant rules of public international law applicable in the relations between the
parties, while VCLT Article 32 adds that (7) under specific conditions, recourse to supplemen-
tary means of interpretation (travaux préparatoires) can take place.
W TO adjudicating bodies have not relied exclusively on the references explicitly mentioned
in the VCLT. In interpreting the covered agreements, those bodies have occasionally used the
lex specialis—a standard under which those bodies have privileged their recourse to the covered
agreement that regulates a particular issue in more detail.112 Lex specialis is not explicitly
included as such in the VCLT, but it is consonant with the principle of effective treaty inter-
pretation (ut regis valeat quam paereat), which provides the cornerstone of the VCLT: were one
not to start from the rule that specifically regulates a particular transaction (and were to priv-
ilege, instead, the application of the more general rule), one risks making such specific rules
redundant. In the words of the AB in U.S.—Gasoline: “An interpreter is not free to adopt a
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or
inutility.113 In this vein, the panel in its report in Canada—Patent Term114 tested whether the
110 Unless special TOR have been agreed between the parties—an infrequent occurrence. For an example, see
Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, W T/DS22/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20,
1997).
111 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 15,
W T/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996) (reported by Maury D. Shenk at 90 AJIL 669 (1996)) [hereinafter U.S.—
Gasoline].
112 See, e.g., Panel Report, EC—Trade Description of Sardines, W T/DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002),
modified by Appellate Body Report, EC—Trade Description of Sardines, W T/D231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23,
2002) [hereinafter EC—Sardines].
113 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 111, at 23.
114 Panel Report, Canada—Term of Patent Protection, para. 6.50, W T/DS170/R (adopted Oct. 12, 2000);
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Term of Patent Protection, W T/DS170/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 2000).
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interpretation it reached on one TRIPS provision rendered redundant other related TRIPS pro-
visions.115
One can thus find space for lex specialis in the VCLT system. The same cannot be said,
however, for other devices that the AB has occasionally used: one would be hard pressed
to bring the principle of evolutionary interpretation, used by the AB in U.S.—Shrimp,
within the four corners of the VCLT system.116 There, the AB, borrowing from some very
infrequently used jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), held that the
term exhaustible natural resources should be understood to cover living organisms (since
this term is evolutionary and not static, at least in the eyes of the AB)—and not simply
nonliving materials, as the negotiating history of GATT Article XX(g) would have sug-
gested. Such examples are nevertheless infrequent; the VCLT emerges as the main plat-
form of interpretation in W TO practice.117
The AB has made reference not only to VCLT Articles 31 and 32, but also to Article 33,
which deals with treaties signed in more than one language: Article XVI of the W TO Agree-
ment, which acknowledges the English, French, and Spanish to be its authentic languages. But
then, which version should be privileged in case of differences in the three texts? VCLT Article
33 stipulates that, in case a treaty has been authenticated in more than one language, the terms
of the treaty shall be presumed to have the same meaning in each linguistic version. W TO adju-
dicating bodies, in the overwhelming majority of the cases, have used English as the working
language.118 There is by now evidence that the AB has sometimes examined the French and
the Spanish text to confirm a decision reached using the English text.119
115 For the same reason, the AB privileged the application of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement), Apr. 15, 1994, W TO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1A, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 5, at
138, over the GATT in its EC—Asbestos and EC—Sardines jurisprudence. Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, W T/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001) (reported by
David A. Wirth at 96 AJIL 435 (2002)), modifying Panel Report, EC—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, W T/DS135/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter EC—Asbestos]; Appellate Body Report,
EC—Sardines, supra note 112. To be fair, no problem would exist at all if lex specialis was practiced only as a means
of ordering the various provisions that would, in any event, be cumulatively examined. But that has not always hap-
pened. Earlier W TO panels adopted a very narrow view of the term “conflict” and also exercised judicial economy.
A good recent example is the panel report on EC—Asbestos, which examined the consistency of the French measure
only under GATT Article III:4 and not under the TBT Agreement. This approach could have been quite prob-
lematic had the measure at hand been nondiscriminatory but unnecessary: whereas GATT Article III:4 requires that
domestic instruments be nondiscriminatory, the TBT Agreement requires that a subset of them (in particular, those
coming under the purview of the TBT Agreement) be necessary (that is, that in terms of impact on trade transactions,
they represent the least restrictive option reasonably available to the regulating state). In this context a nondiscrim-
inatory, but unnecessary, measure would thus pass the test of legitimacy under GATT Article III:4. Starting the
analysis from the lex specialis avoids such problems, even if all the potentially applicable provisions have not been
cumulatively reviewed.
116 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, para.
130, W T/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) (reported by Gregory Shaffer at 93 AJIL 507 (1999)) [hereinafter
U.S—Shrimp]. This report may be a unique instance of evolutionary interpretation in W TO dispute settlement.
117 This is not to suggest that GATT panels never used the VCLT. The creation of the Legal Affairs Division in
the eighties in the GATT marked the turning point in this direction and an adoption of VCLT-friendly interpre-
tations. See HUDEC, supra note 82. 50. On the negotiating history of GATT Article XX(g), see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN,
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, & ALAN O. SYKES, THE GENESIS OF THE GATT (2008).
118 A notable counterexample is the panel proceedings in EC—Asbestos.
119 See Appellate Body Report, EC—Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural
Products, para. 271, W T/DS207/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002); Appellate Body Report, EC—Anti-dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, para. 123, W T/DS14/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001).
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The AB has further clarified—in U.S.—Softwood Lumber IV120 —that in accordance with
VCLT Article 33, it should: “seek the meaning that gives effect, simultaneously, to all the terms
of the treaty, as they are used in each authentic language.” This approach would suggest that
the treaty interpreter should privilege interpretations that overlap in the three different texts.
In its report in EC—Tariff Preferences,121 however, the AB privileged the terms used in the
French and the Spanish texts (“as defined”), which, to its own admission, reflected stronger,
more obligatory language than the terms used in the English text (“as described”). In light of
the narrow interpretative space between described and defined in the context at hand, one
would probably be ill advised to accord too much importance to this finding.
Interpreting and applying the VCLT is not exact science; depending on the weight one
places on one (or more) of its elements, a different outcome is possible. One can also, at least
nominally, use all the mandated references while having already decided the issue under one
of them. It is not the purpose of our discussion here to evaluate, in detailed manner, the use
of the VCLT by W TO adjudicating bodies. Nevertheless, I will present a description and gen-
eral assessment—a necessary prelude to our discussion on how interpretative elements are to
be identified. I will try to make three points in what immediately follows:
1. W TO adjudicating bodies have relied heavily on what they understand to be the
ordinary meaning of the terms, and much less on elements such as context, state
practice, or subsequent agreements.
2. When in doubt, they prefer to classify interpretative elements under supplementary
means. This approach is obviously in line with their incentive structure to maintain
maximum flexibility in the future; it is, unfortunately, on occasion, incorrect.
3. The treatment of identical references has, on occasion, been inconsistent across
cases.
W TO adjudicating bodies have had extensive recourse to dictionary meaning of terms (with
a particular inclination to use the Oxford English Dictionary). In the past, the reader of a report
has sometimes been left with the impression that dictionary-based, but acontextual, interpre-
tations have carried too much weight.122 It is probably counterproductive to revisit such exam-
ples in detail. Suffice it to say that W TO adjudicating bodies have applied the VCLT in a com-
partmentalized manner: starting from ordinary meaning as a self-standing or independent
entity, they have often reached a substantive legal conclusion based solely on the Oxford English
Dictionary—a conclusion that they confirm, in turn, through recourse to the other interpre-
tative elements (context and so on). This approach is incorrect, however, under the very terms
of the VCLT: the ordinary meaning of an expression cannot be determined in isolation; the
ordinary meaning of a particular legal term can be understood only as it occurs in a particular
sentence, which itself has to understood and evaluated in the context of the overall contract or
120 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain
Softwood Lumber from Canada, para. 59, W T/DS257/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 2004) (reported by Chi Carmody
at 100 AJIL 664 (2006)) [hereinafter U.S.—Softwood Lumber IV].
121 Appellate Body Report, EC—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
para. 147, W T/DS246/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter EC—Tariff Preferences].
122 See Trachtman, supra note 21; DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2004). Wittgenstein, unfortunately, was
never an AB member.
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agreement to which it belongs.123 This consequence follows naturally from the realization that
words are not invariant or static in meaning (as dictionaries sometimes want them to be);124
they have a life within a particular integrated context where they are lodged.
An inquiry into the context (that is, the rest of the agreement at the very least)125 will lead
the judge to ask two centrally important questions:
1. What did the framers have in mind when they passed this law?
2. How did they conceive the realization of their stated objectives?126
Contextual interpretations will thus lead the W TO judge to inquire both as to the ends sought
and the means to those ends. Importantly, words will be placed in their appropriate context and
be used in order to serve the stated objectives: as Orwell wrote in his essay Politics and the English
Language, “let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way around.” W TO adjudi-
cating bodies should, for example, be asking the question “What does the term like products
mean in the context of disciplining domestic instruments within a trade agreement aiming to
liberalize trade?” rather than attempting to determine the meaning of the term based on the
many definitions of likeness to be found in the Oxford English Dictionary.127
The AB seems recently to have gotten it right in U.S.—Gambling,128 where it stated that
equating dictionary definitions to the ordinary meaning of terms is too mechanical an
approach. With good fortune, this realization might serve to guide future judges; my under-
standing of this U.S.—Gambling dictum is that W TO adjudicating bodies should break with
the compartmentalized approach used before.
Finally, it will become obvious to the reader that the approach followed until now by W TO
adjudicating bodies has an inescapable by-product: the use of fewer interpretative elements
than a contextual approach would have required.129
123 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS
1 (1978-I).
124 There have been a number of papers criticizing the (often) exaggerated textualism to which the W TO adju-
dicating bodies adhere. None, to my mind, has done so as eloquently as Henrik Horn & Joseph H. H. Weiler, Euro-
pean Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, in THE W TO CASE-LAW OF
2001 14 (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003).
125 And into other relevant documents, as explained below, see infra notes 130–46 and accompanying text.
126 Contrary to teleological interpretation, which typically asks the first question, contextual interpretation does
not risk imposing obligations on W TO members that the framers did not envisage in the first place. Jiminéz de
Aréchaga, see supra note 123, explains persuasively why it was felt by the VCLT’s drafters that teleological inter-
pretations should be avoided. See also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
127 Mavroidis offers specific examples where, following acontextual interpretations, the AB ended up imposing
obligations that were, in all likelihood, not envisaged by the framers. Two prominent examples are the benchmark
for calculating benefits in SCM Article 14, as discussed in U.S.—Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 120, and the dis-
cipline on export credits under Article 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture, as discussed in U.S.—Upland Cotton, see
infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text, are but two prominent examples). Petros C. Mavroidis, Legal Eagles?
A Look into 10 Years of AB Case-Law (Discussion Paper No. 49, APEC Study Center, Columbia University) (2007).
McRae has advanced additional arguments in favor of contextual interpretations. Donald McRae, The W TO in
International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier? 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27 (2000).
128 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Bet-
ting Services, para. 166, W T/DS285/AB/R & corr.1 (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) (reported by Joel P. Trachtman at
99 AJIL 861 (2005)) [hereinafter U.S.—Gambling].
129 This is so, because the W TO judge is typically not in doubt as to the meaning of a term following an evaluation
of the ordinary meaning of the terms. The W TO judge will, thus not have to search actively for references to support
the conclusion reached.
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The VCLT as Means of Identifying and Classifying the Interpretative Elements
We now turn to our discussion of interpretative elements. Through interpretation itself,
W TO adjudicating bodies also identify the interpretative elements that they have used to
determine a particular issue. Let us go back to the already cited example concerning the inter-
pretation in U.S.—Shrimp of the term exhaustible natural resources appearing in GATT Article
XX(g). Recourse (by the AB) to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies130 (CITES), which provides its own definition of the term, means that a multilateral envi-
ronmental agreement (MEA) could serve as an interpretative element of a term used in the
W TO Agreement. The interpretation of the covered agreements becomes thus the pathway
that will lead us to the identification of the interpretative elements.
Relevance is the first step. The second step is the classification of the interpretative elements:
the VCLT contains a hierarchy of the various elements; recourse to some of them is compul-
sory, whereas to others, optional. VCLT Article 32 clearly indicates that recourse to supple-
mentary means of interpretation will be made only in accordance with the conditions included
therein and, in any event, only after recourse to VCLT Article 31 has been made and has either
proved fruitless or requires confirmation. Recourse to all elements included in the VCLT Arti-
cle 31 list is compulsory, though they are arranged hierarchically— a point that the AB, echoing
the VCLT’s negotiating history,131 made clear in U.S.—Shrimp.132 In this context, the AB
noted that the object and purpose of the treaty have an auxiliary function:
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision
to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that
the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the
meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of
the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose
of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.133
It follows that, every time a W TO adjudicating body refers to an interpretative element under
a particular heading of VCLT Articles 31–32, it has ipso facto prejudged its legal value as well.
130 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993
UNTS 243, 12 ILM 1085 (1973).
131 Quoting from Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 123, at 165:
It is important to remark that “the object and purpose of the treaty” is mentioned not as an independent ele-
ment as in the Harvard Draft Convention but at the end of paragraph 1. This was done deliberately, in order
to make clear that “object and purpose” are part of the context, the most important one, but not an auton-
omous element in interpretation, independent of and on the same level as the text, as is advocated by the par-
tisans of the teleological method of interpretation.
132 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 116, para. 114. There can be no dispute that a hierarchy
exists between VCLT Articles 31 and 32 since the latter makes explicit that recourse to the supplementary means
of interpretation is available only in accordance with the conditions it states. See section below on Supplementary
Means.
133 This passage from the Appellate Body report in U.S.—Shrimp was cited in the panel report on EC—Chicken
Cuts as evidence of the hierarchy among the various interpretative elements laid down in VCLT Article 31. Panel
Report, EC—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 7.92, W T/DS269/R,
W T/DS269/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2005), modified by Appellate Body Report, EC—Customs Classification of Fro-
zen Boneless Chicken Cuts, W T/DS269/AB/R, W T/DS286/AB/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter
EC—Chicken Cuts].
28 [Vol. 102:000THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Panels must, for example, always examine the relevance of an MEA, if they consider it to be
a subsequent agreement, as per VCLT Article 31(3); if, instead, it is considered to be a supple-
mentary means of interpretation, then recourse to the MEA is at their discretion. Since terms
appearing in the VCLT are not always given a precise substantive content, however,134 such
classification is not always a mechanic exercise.
Practice reveals that only on occasion have W TO adjudicating bodies explicitly identified
the heading under which they have examined the various interpretative elements that they have
used. Take, for example, the AB report in Korea—Dairy,135 which is quite representative: it
discussed a GATT-adopted report to support its interpretation of the term unforeseen devel-
opments; we are left in the dark as to the classification of the GATT panel report under the head-
ings of the VCLT. By the same token, in Chile—Price Band,136 where the AB discussed the
term so as to afford protection appearing in GATT Article III:2, it referred to a series of previous
W TO AB reports while stopping short of mentioning the relevance of such reports under the
VCLT. The same could be said for many other reports. As a result, the classification exercise
is largely left to the observer. To be sure, W TO adjudicating bodies have left no doubt with
respect to some elements: the travaux préparatoires of the covered agreements have been con-
sistently discussed under VCLT Article 32.
That said, the scope of most of the VCLT references is not in doubt: the ordinary terms of
a treaty can apply only to the text of the covered agreements; the object and purpose refer to the
object and purpose of a treaty as such—in our case, the W TO Agreement (including the stated
object and purpose in various specific covered agreements—and is usually reflected in the pre-
amble; and a time element distinguishes subsequent practice and subsequent agreement from all
other elements reflected in the VCLT.
The substantive boundary between context and supplementary means of interpretation
remains a matter of some dispute. Because the legal value of the two references is different, the
classification exercise will entail important consequences. The term supplementary means of
interpretation is defined only in part by VCLT Article 32 since, by its very terms, this provision
covers “supplementary means of interpretation, including”—that is, but not necessarily limited
to—“the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion” (emphasis
added). By contrast, the term context is defined in VCLT Article 31(2) as follows:
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in con-
nection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
134 For example, VCLT Article 32 refers to supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work.
We do not know what else is intended.
135 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, para.
98, W T/DS98/AB/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2000).
136 Appellate Body Report, Chile—Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural
Products, W T/DS207/AB/R & corr.1 (adopted Oct. 23, 2002).
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conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related
to the treaty.
Both definitions refer to actions that occurred in the past: prior to, or at the conclusion of, the
treaty. The supplementary means are in a vertical relationship with the final agreement: pre-
paratory work is an input into the final product. By contrast, context points to a horizontal rela-
tionship. The immediate context of any particular provision in any given international agree-
ment comprises the rest of the agreement and its preamble and annexes. The broader context
for a provision can encompass self-standing instruments, insofar their subject matter relates to
that of the primary treaty in question.
Just what should be understood as context for the W TO Agreement itself is not answered
in the Agreement and is largely left to the adjudicator. The only legislative guidance is of a tem-
poral nature: the context, however defined, must be in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty. The work of the special rapporteur Waldock137 provides ample evidence that this tem-
poral element—referring, in particular, to agreements signed when the treaty was being con-
cluded—was fully intended. In the case of the W TO Agreement, we cannot, for example,
regard as context any legal instruments that were signed after April 1994, when the Uruguay
round package was signed at Marrakesh.
VCLT Article 31(2)(b) can be interpreted quite broadly: the reference to any instrument
relating to the treaty could potentially include instruments that relate only remotely to the orig-
inal contract. Notwithstanding its imprecision, that same provision seems to suggest that a crit-
ical determinant is the intent of the parties to see the original and the contextual agreements
as part of a whole.
As to the role of non-W TO international law, there is wide disagreement. Although
some authors, such as Pauwelyn,138 argue that non-W TO international law may be appli-
cable in W TO dispute settlement, most commentators agree that non-W TO interna-
tional law is relevant not as a source, but as interpretative element. For example, even
authors such as Kuijper,139 who takes the view that the W TO regime is self-contained
when it comes to state responsibility, or Trachtman,140 who believes that W TO adjudi-
cators cannot apply non-W TO international law, adopt a more “liberal” attitude when it
comes to seeing the relevance of public international law in the interpretation of the W TO
Agreement. From a more social science– based perspective, Howse141 warns against the
danger of interpreting the W TO Agreement in clinical isolation from the rest of public
international law and thus of constructing it as an agreement with little connection to
today’s problems and concerns.
Table 1 provides a schematic account of how W TO adjudicating bodies have classified var-
ious interpretative elements. I then move to a critical discussion of the case law.
137 Humphrey Waldock, Humphrey, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/156 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 36.
138 PAUWELYN, supra note 72.
139 Pieter Kuijper, The Law of the GATT as a Special Field of International Law: Ignorance, Further Refinement or
Self-Contained System of International Law? NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT’L L. 227.
140 Trachtman, supra note 21; Trachtman, supra note 25.
141 Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and
Environmental Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491 (2002).
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The Text
As already mentioned above, W TO adjudicating bodies have made extensive use of the
Oxford English Dictionary (as well as other dictionaries) in order to interpret the W TO Agree-
ment and its annexes.
The Context
The panel report in EC—Chicken Cuts142 addressed a dispute between the EC and Brazil
concerning the proper tariff classification of salted meat under the Harmonized System (HS)
treaty.143 To do that, the panel first had to pronounce on the legal relevance of the HS. The
142 Panel Report, EC—Chicken Cuts, supra note 133, paras. 7.190–.241; Appellate Body Report,
EC—Chicken Cuts, supra note 133, para. 199.
143 International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, June 14, 1983,
1035 UNTS 3.
TABLE 1.












































































HS treaty, which provides a classification for all goods traded internationally, binds several
W TO members that have formally ratified it and de facto is observed by other W TO mem-
bers, when scheduling their commitments: although it is not explicitly referred to in the
GATT, parties routinely have recourse to it is during negotiations. It has been referred to in
many disputes involving tariff-classification issues but, except for a cryptic statement by the AB
in EC—Computer Equipment144 to the effect that interpretation of schedules should be in line
with the HS, W TO adjudicating bodies had not clarified its status prior to EC—Chicken Cuts.
That panel held that in the sense of VCLT Article 31(2), the HS treaty is part of the context
for the GATT. Based on this conclusion, the panel examined in detail the HS rules of inter-
pretation. The approach of the EC—Chicken Cuts panel was eventually confirmed by the AB.
At the moment of writing, the HS treaty is the only item of international law that has been
found to be context for the W TO Agreement.145
Object and Purpose
W TO adjudicating bodies have correctly referred to the object and purpose of the treaty as
a whole, not of its specific provisions: various reports146 mention the GATT’s preamble or its
annexes as providing an authentic description of the object and purpose of the instrument that
they are interpreting. They have abstained from teleological interpretations, however, which
inherently carry the risk of violating DSU Article 3.2 (the balance of rights and obligations)
since in international relations, sovereigns agree both on common ends and on the means to
pursue them. Interpreting the former without taking account of the latter could violate the
clauses of the contractual arrangement.
Subsequent Agreement
The panel report in Mexico—Telecoms147 relied heavily on a series of regulations and recom-
mendations by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to clarify its understand-
ing of accounting rates. In support of its decision to move and discuss various ITU instru-
ments, the panel noted the following: the ITU regulations are instruments binding both Mex-
ico and the United States; the ITU recommendations are relevant since the parties to the dis-
pute, as well many other W TO members, are members of the ITU. Essentially, without explic-
itly saying so, this panel suggested that it was treating the ITU regulations and
recommendations as something akin to subsequent agreement in the sense of VCLT Article
31(3).
Irrespective of the merits of this approach, it is imperative to ask whether Mexico—Telecoms
can be considered representative. There are good reasons to answer this question in the neg-
ative: first, it is only a panel report; second, the AB, when confronted with a more or less similar
situation, preferred to use multilateral agreements concluded outside the W TO as involving
144 Appellate Body Report, EC—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, para. 89,
W T/DS62/AB/R, W T/DS67/AB/R, W T/DS68/AB/R (adopted June 22, 1998) [hereinafter EC—Computer
Equipment].
145 On the issue of interpretation of schedules, see Isabelle Van Damme, The Interpretation of Schedules of Com-
mitments, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 1 (2007).
146 See, for example, the AB report in EC—Chicken Cuts, supra note 133, paras. 236–38.
147 Panel Report, Mexico—Telecoms, supra note 32, paras. 7.129–.136.
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factual issues only—and not, that is, as providing supplementary means of interpretation. All
this leads me to conclude that Mexico—Telecoms is a highly atypical case on this particular issue.
Subsequent Practice
The most recent W TO case law seems to have adopted the view that only unanimous prac-
tice by all W TO members could qualify as subsequent practice. This approach amounts to
introducing an exceedingly restrictive filter in the sense that few, if any, practices are unani-
mous and could thus qualify as subsequent practice in conformity with VCLT Article 31(3).
The AB first found, in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II148 that subsequent practice within the
meaning of Article 31(3)(b) entails a “‘concordant, common and consistent’ sequence of acts
or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern implying the agree-
ment of the parties [to a treaty] regarding its interpretation.” In U.S.—Gambling,149 the AB
clarified that establishing subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) involved
two elements: “(i) there must be a common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pro-
nouncements; and (ii) those acts or pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpre-
tation of the relevant provision.” In EC—Computer Equipment,150 the AB went so far as to state
that classification decisions by the HS Committee could be considered subsequent practice.
Then, in EC—Chicken Cuts151 the panel held that practice by one W TO member alone can
qualify as subsequent practice—in the VCLT sense of the term—if it is the only relevant prac-
tice. In the case at hand, the EC was the only importing W TO member with any practice of
classifying the products in question (salted chicken cuts). In light of this factual observation,
the panel accepted such evidence as subsequent practice in accordance with VCLT Article
31(3). We should recall that under VCLT Article 31(3), adjudicating bodies must take into
account relevant subsequent practice.
On appeal, the AB half-closed the door to this understanding of the term subsequent practice.
It held that a few W TO members (but not only one) might establish subsequent practice—if
only a few have traded in a particular commodity. The AB rejected the view, however, that reli-
ance on practice by just one member is relevant to establishing subsequent practice in the
VCLT sense of the term:
We share the Panel’s view that not each and every party must have engaged in a par-
ticular practice for it to qualify as a “common” and “concordant” practice. Nevertheless,
practice by some, but not all parties is obviously not of the same order as practice by only
one, or very few parties. To our mind, it would be difficult to establish a “concordant, com-
mon and discernible pattern” on the basis of acts or pronouncements of one, or very few
parties to a multilateral treaty, such as the W TO Agreement. We acknowledge, however,
that, if only some W TO Members have actually traded or classified products under a given
heading, this circumstance may reduce the availability of such “acts and pronouncements”
148 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 12, W T/DS8/AB/R, W T/DS10/AB/R,
W T/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996), modifying Panel Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
W T/DS8/R, W T/DS10/R, W T/DS11/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II].
149 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gambling, supra note 128, para. 192.
150 Appellate Body Report, EC—Computer Equipment, supra note 144, para. 90.
151 Panel Report, EC—Chicken Cuts, supra note 133, para. 7.289.
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for purposes of determining the existence of “subsequent practice” within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(b).152
Commenting on the AB Report in EC—Computer Equipment, the AB in EC—Chicken Cuts
noted:
The Appellate Body made these statements in the context of an interpretation pursuant
to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, but, as the Panel put it, these statements “confirm[]
the importance of the classification practice of the importing Member whose schedule is
being interpreted [but] also indicate[] that the classification practice of other W TO Mem-
bers, including the exporting Member’s practice, may be relevant.” In our view, these state-
ments cannot be read to justify exclusive reliance on the importing Member’s classification
practice. Therefore, we fail to see how the Panel’s finding that it was “reasonable to rely
upon EC classification practice alone in determining whether or not there is ‘subsequent
practice’ that ‘establishes the agreement’ of WTO Members within the meaning of Article
31(3)(b)” can be reconciled with these statements of the Appellate Body in EC—Computer
Equipment.153
Other Relevant Rules of Public International Law
The AB in its report in EC—Chicken Cuts held that the HS treaty could possibly qualify as
an “other relevant rule of public international law” under VCLT Article 31(3)(c). Since the
AB’s discussion is rather cryptic, however, it is probably wise not to see too much in it.154
Special Meaning
The panel in its report in Mexico—Telecoms155 discussed at length whether the term inter-
connection appearing in the Telecoms Reference Paper had been given a special meaning by the
W TO negotiators, only to conclude that it had not. In arriving at this conclusion, however,
the panel neglected to review carefully all the relevant negotiating documents. Indeed, some
of them, such as the Memorandum on Accounting Rates,156 could have led the panel to con-
clude that the term interconnection was meant to cover only mode 3—that is, cases where an
investor establishes commercial presence in a foreign country and supplies services from its pre-
mises.
Supplementary Means
Supplementary means is the most extensive category of interpretive elements classified as such
by W TO adjudicating bodies. Recall that by virtue of VCLT Article 32 (emphasis added,
below), a judge has substantial discretion to shape the list of supplementary means:
152 Appellate Body Report, EC—Chicken Cuts, supra note 133, para. 259.
153 Id., para. 266.
154 Id., paras. 195–200 . Moreover, as argued above, the HS has been acknowledged as legal context for the W TO
Agreement anyway.
155 Panel Report, Mexico—Telecoms, supra note 32, paras. 7.108–.117.
156 This memorandum is an understanding reached at the end of the negotiations and reflected in paragraph 7
of the Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications, W TO doc. S/GBT/4 (Feb. 15, 1997). The understanding
was later confirmed (taken note of) by the Council for Trade in Services, in paragraph 8 of the Report to the General
Council on Activities During 1997, W TO Doc. S/C/5 (Nov. 28, 1997).
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Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the prepa-
ratory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
The most frequently used supplementary means is the travaux préparatoires of the W TO
Agreement and its annexes.
Travaux préparatoires of the W TO Agreement. As already discussed, the term may in VCLT
Article 32 makes it clear that recourse to supplementary means is not a matter of legal com-
pulsion: the judge has substantial discretion on this score. There are many good reasons arguing
against recourse: not everyone participates in negotiations; the negotiating history often points
to no concrete outcome; or a provision might have acquired a whole new meaning over the
years. There are also good arguments, however, in favor of recourse: negotiations are evidence
of the will of the principals (the framers) and thus help circumscribe the mandate of the agents
(adjudicating bodies): recourse to the negotiating history helps to ensure that by the end of the
interpretative exercise, W TO adjudicating bodies will have respected their mandate, under
DSU Article 3.2, not to undo the balance of rights and obligations as struck by the framers.
Since arguments can be made both in favor and against recourse to the preparatory work, the
drafters of VCLT thought it sensible to leave it to adjudicating bodies to decide when such
recourse should be made.
What VCLT Article 32 does specify is how such supplementary means are to be used:
recourse to them is appropriate in order either to confirm a conclusion reached or to determine
the meaning if that remains uncertain after the interpretative elements included in VCLT Arti-
cle 31 have been exhausted. Obviously, it is the latter use that enhances the value and relevance
of travaux préparatoires.
The customary nature of VCLT Article 32. In an effort to eliminate doubts157 regarding the
status of VCLT Article 32 in public international law, the AB held in Japan—Alcoholic Bev-
erages II158 that there can be no doubt that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, dealing with
the role of supplementary means of interpretation, has attained the status of a rule of customary
international law.
Conditions for recourse to travaux préparatoires in practice. W TO adjudicating bodies have
had recourse to VCLT Article 32 for various reasons: (1) Sometimes, when it would be helpful
in order to confirm an interpretation reached, (2) always, in order to clarify the meaning of a
term left obscure after the interpretative elements in VCLT Article 32 have been exhausted,
and (3) very rarely, before exhausting those elements.
The picture emerging from an examination of the W TO case law demonstrates the overall
tendency of adjudicating bodies to use travaux préparatoires as a means of supporting conclu-
sions that they have already reached. On fewer occasions, recourse to travaux préparatoires was
made because the meaning of a provision was thought to be obscure: in all such cases, however,
157 Although in United States—Gasoline, supra note 111, the AB had already clarified that the VCLT system cod-
ifies the customary rules of interpretation, through this ruling in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 148, it
makes clear that its prior ruling covers not only VCLT Article 31, but also Article 32.
158 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 148, at 97.
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it is through recourse to the travaux préparatoires that the adjudicating bodies sought clarifi-
cations.. The panel reports in India—Quantitative Restrictions159 and Canada—Pharmaceu-
tical Patents160 are representative of cases where recourse to travaux préparatoires was made in
order to confirm an interpretation already reached under VCLT Article 31. The AB has occa-
sionally made use of this potential resource in a more nuanced manner: U.S.—Upland Cot-
ton161 suggests, though without taking an explicit position, that recourse to the preparatory
work was not necessary in order to decide whether export credits were a form of export subsidy
covered by the W TO Agreement on Agriculture. Nevertheless, it proceeded to examine some
preparatory work and confirmed its initial view.162
Recourse to travaux préparatoires in order to determine a provision’s meaning—as opposed
to clarifying a meaning left obscure after making recourse to VCLT Article 31—is rare. In Can-
ada—Pharmaceutical Patents163 the panel, when called to interpret the term limited exceptions
figuring in TRIPS Article 30, moved directly to the preparatory work of TRIPS Article 30 instead
of examining the term in accordance with the sequence specified in the VCLT. By the same
token, in Korea—Procurement,164 before having recourse to the process defined in VCLT Arti-
cle 31, the panel moved directly to the negotiating history of Korea’s accession to the W TO
Agreement on Government Procurement in order to satisfy itself as to the actual extent of the
obligations assumed by Korea. In Canada—Dairy,165 after holding that a notation in Canada’s
schedule of commitment was not clear on its face (as being general and ambiguous), the AB
moved to the preparatory work in order to clarify the scope of Canada’s engagement and only
thereafter considered the sources identified in VCLT Article 31. Cases such as the above should
be only as outliers, however; in the overwhelming majority of the cases, W TO adjudicating
bodies have first tried to exhaust the references of VCLT Article 31 before moving to Article
32.166 A recent, representative example is U.S.—Gambling,167 where the AB decided that
159 Panel Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products,
para. 5.110, W T/DS90/R (adopted Sept. 22, 1999); Appellate Body Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, W T/DS90/AB/R (adopted Sept. 22, 1999).
160 Panel Report, Canada—Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 36, para. 7.47.
161 Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, W T/DS267/AB/R, paras. 623–27
(adopted Mar. 21, 2005) (reported by Richard H. Steinberg at 99 AJIL 852 (2005)) [hereinafter U.S.—Upland
Cotton].
162 Interestingly, in a separate opinion (at paragraphs 631–41), one member of the AB checking the same nego-
tiating history reached the opposite conclusion—namely, that export credits are not covered by the existing dis-
ciplines. It should be noted, however, that even this member of the AB falls short of stating that recourse to pre-
paratory work was strictly necessary under the circumstances.
163 Panel Report, Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 36, para. 7.29.
164 Panel Report, Korea—Procurement, supra note 69, paras. 7.74–83.
165 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy
Products, para. 138, W T/DS103/AB/R, W T/DS113/AB/R (adopted Oct. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Canada—
Dairy].
166 Nevertheless, one cannot help thinking whether, and to what extent, the VCLT is the best tool for discussing
the scope of contractual elements. Some of its elements (such as text, context) seem appropriate, whereas others
(such as relevant rules of public international law) seem far less so. Technically, all schedules of concessions are
annexes to the W TO Agreement and are therefore, by virtue of DSU Article 3.2, subject to interpretation through
the VCLT. A strong argument can be made, however, in support of the contrary position. When trading partners
make a promise to each other, they are laying out the foundation on which a treaty will eventually be founded and
not the other way round. The VCLT is probably the last thing that negotiators have in mind when exchanging con-
cessions.
It seems that in this particular context, evidence sought through what is called “circumstances surrounding the
conclusion of a negotiation” in VCLT Article 32 should probably take precedence over any other interpretative
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recourse to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of GATS was necessary for it to clar-
ify the scope of the U.S. commitment with respect to cross-border supply of betting and gam-
bling services; in the AB’s view, the scope of that commitment remained unclear following
exhaustion of the interpretative elements included in VCLT Article 31. Note the difference in
the two AB reports: Canada—Dairy moves to VCLT Article 32 without any reference to the
elements of Article 31, whereas U.S.—Gambling does the exact opposite. The latter is later in
time and for this reason alone, it can be taken as better reflecting the AB’s current approach.
Negotiating documents. GATT/W TO negotiations are usually divided among various nego-
tiating groups, each with a specific mandate. It is common for negotiators to ask the chairman
of a negotiating group to sum up in a paper the picture emerging from group discussions at a
certain stage. Such documents help reveal the extent of agreement and the extent of disagree-
ment among parties—without, however, reflecting a legally binding agreement. During the
proceedings that led to the panel report in U.S.—Softwood Lumber III,168 the panel was
requested to provide an opinion on the legal relevance of discussion papers that were exchanged
during negotiations. The panel decided that such papers were of no probative value.
We note that the text of the SCM Agreement does not in any way provide an exception
for the right to exploit natural resources. The only exception from the term “goods or ser-
vices” provided for in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM Agreement is general infrastructure, not
natural resources. Moreover, the paper referred to by Canada in support of its argument
that harvesting rights are not covered by Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM Agreement, called Dis-
cussion Paper No. 6, is an “informal discussion paper” from the Chairman of the Nego-
tiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures dated 4 September 1990, which
together with six other “informal discussion papers” was circulated in preparation for the
issuance of a revised version of the Chairman’s draft text of the SCM Agreement. Canada
argues that this Discussion Paper reflects an understanding at the time of the SCM Agree-
ment negotiations of the fundamental difference between tangible commercial inputs and
intangible real property rights. We note however that, as stated in the Chairman’s Note
accompanying the discussion paper, this paper was circulated solely to “facilitate” discus-
sions and that it did not reflect the Chairman’s view of “what may be included in the sub-
sequent revision”, nor did it “have any status relating [it] to the Chairman’s paper.” The
Note further states that some of the views expressed in the discussion papers “are purpose-
fully provocative in order to make evident technical complexities and/or workability (or
its lack) of certain approaches.” In our view, this Discussion Paper thus has little if any pro-
bative value, especially in light of the fact that the reference to “harvesting rights” as sep-
arate from “goods” was not included in the final text of the Agreement.
In U.S.—Carbon Steel169 the AB clarified that absence of probative value does not mean that
such documents should be regarded as totally irrelevant. Indeed, in its view, a chairman’s note
elements. Unfortunately, the recent case law of the AB, when called to interpret the scope of commitments, leaves
much to be desired in terms of faithfully reproducing the balance of rights and obligations as struck by the nego-
tiating partners. See, for example, the Appellate Body reports in U.S.—Upland Cotton, supra note 161, EC—Export
Subsidies on Sugar, supra note 95, and U.S.—Gambling, supra note 128, as well as the panel report in Mexico—Tele-
coms, supra note 32.
167 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gambling, supra note 128, paras. 197–212.
168 Panel Report, United States—Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada, para. 7.26, W T/DS236/R (adopted Nov. 1, 2002) (reported by Chi Carmody at 100 AJIL 664 (2006)).
169 Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel
Flat Products from Germany, para. 90 n.83, W T/DS213/AB/R & corr.1 (adopted Dec. 19, 2002).
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could serve as indication as to what has been discussed among negotiators. This report thus
reveals the AB’s willingness to examine notes prepared by negotiating group chairmen that
summarize the group’s discussions in order to see whether a particular issue was actually raised
during negotiations. Without explicitly saying so, the AB seemed willing to treat such docu-
ments as supplementary means of interpretation.
Recall our discussion about the legal significance of the HS treaty. That document is not the
only one that can be used in order to schedule concessions. There are other, informal agree-
ments that are often negotiated among the trading partners that serve the same function. They
are not, however, elevated to the status of context. One could hypothesize that in the eyes of
WTO adjudicating bodies, the form of a document influences its classification and therefore
how it is used. In this vein, the HS treaty was most likely acknowledged as context because it
is an international treaty, whereas other informal documents serving a similar function have
been either used as supplementary means or reduced to irrelevance. The Modalities Paper,170
for example, reflected an agreement among negotiators during the Uruguay round with regard
to the schedules of commitments in the farm trade. The AB on two occasions dismissed171 the
interpretative relevance of the Modalities Paper altogether. In EC—Bananas III172 the AB held
that the Modalities Paper is not explicitly referenced in the W TO Agreement on Agriculture,
and it implied that the paper could, at best, serve as a supplementary means of interpretation.
Then, in EC—Export Subsidies on Sugar,173 the AB categorically held that the Modalities Paper
did not constitute an agreement among parties (which is a point beside the point) and decided
to ignore it altogether.174 In the GATS context, informal papers have been accorded the status
of supplementary means. The panel report in Mexico—Telecoms175 discussed, inter alia, the
relevance of GATT/W TO secretariat notes prepared at the request of the negotiating parties dur-
ing a trade round (in the case at hand, the Uruguay Round). This panel was examining the
relevance of the Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, a doc-
ument prepared by the secretariat and later adopted by the GATS Council, the ratione materiae
competent body to decide on the adoption of such documents). The aim of the document, now
widely know as the Scheduling Guidelines, was to help prospective W TO members in sched-
uling their commitments in the services sector. These guidelines are the equivalent for the
GATS to the HS treaty for the GATT—except that, in contrast to the HS treaty, Scheduling
Guidelines was formally a decision of the GATS Council and not an international treaty to
which sovereigns can adhere. The panel decided to use the guidelines as supplementary means:
7.43. Additional evidence, for the view that cross-border supply does not imply the pres-
ence of the service supplier in the market into which the service is delivered, is contained
170 Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments Under the Reform Programme, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/MA/W/24 (Dec. 20, 1993).
171 Nevertheless, reading carefully paragraphs 138 to 157 of the AB’s report in Canada—Dairy, supra note 165,
one may well be left with the impression that AB took the Modalities Paper into account on the way to its finding
about the ambit of Canada’s commitment.
172 Appellate Body Report, EC—Bananas III, supra note 43, para.157.
173 Appellate Body Report, EC—Export Subsidies on Sugar, supra note 95, para. 199.
174 The central question, of course, was whether the Modalities Paper could have served as supplementary means
of interpretation.
175 Panel Report, Mexico—Telecoms, supra note 32, paras. 7.43–.44.
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in a document entitled “Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explan-
atory Note” (the “Explanatory Note”), issued by the GATT Secretariat as a working doc-
ument for the Group of Negotiations on Services. The Explanatory Note states that the
supply of a service through telecommunications is an example of cross-border supply
“since the service supplier is not present within the territory of the Member where the ser-
vice is delivered” (emphasis added). We accord substantial interpretative weight to this
statement. The Explanatory Note was requested by the Group of Negotiations on Services,
and issued in September 1993, during a period of intense drafting of initial commitments
to meet the deadline for the completion of schedules in December of that year. During and
after that period, the Explanatory Note was heavily relied upon by negotiators to interpret
their own and other negotiators’ commitments. The Explanatory Note was revised some-
what in 2001—without however modifying the statement with respect to the presence of
cross border suppliers—and was adopted by the Council on Trade in Services as “Guide-
lines for the scheduling of specific commitments under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS)” (the “Scheduling Guidelines”). Even though the Explanatory Note
and the Scheduling Guidelines each state that they cannot be considered as “authoritative”
or “legal” interpretations of the GATS, we find that the source, content, and use by nego-
tiators of the Explanatory Note, together with its later adoption by Members as the Sched-
uling Guidelines, provides an important element with which to interpret the provisions
of the GATS.
7.44. In interpreting the scope of cross border supply in Article I:2(a) of the GATS, we
need not decide whether the Explanatory Note provides “context” (as an agreement or
instrument made in connection with the conclusion of the GATS) under paragraph 2 of
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, or whether it can be “taken into account”, together
with the context, as a subsequent agreement or practice under paragraph 3 of the same pro-
vision. In any case, we consider that the source, content and use of the Explanatory Note
make it part of the “circumstances” of the conclusion of the GATS, within the meaning
of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. We may therefore properly have recourse to the
Explanatory Note to confirm our understanding of the ordinary meaning of Article I:2(a)
of the GATS.
This finding was echoed in U.S.—Gambling,176 where the AB held the Scheduling Guidelines
(the document discussed in Mexico—Telecoms) to be part of the travaux préparatoires, as the
latter are defined in VCLT Article 32. The AB, in U.S.—Gambling, paid particular attention
to the fact that W TO members based their commitments on the Scheduling Guidelines. Note,
however, the contrast between this approach and that taken in EC—Export Subsidies on Sug-
ar.177 In that case the AB noted the absence of any reference to the Modalities Paper in the
W TO Agreement on Agriculture—without even asking whether there are schedules in use
that have been based on the paper’s scheduling guidelines. The mere lack of a mention in the
Agreement on Agriculture was considered adequate to determine the matter. The rationale for
accepting the Scheduling Guidelines as supplementary means and rejecting the Modalities Paper
is thus not the same. Again, form seems to be the distinguishing feature (although not explicitly
relied upon by the AB): the Modalities Paper is a document prepared by the W TO secretariat
and circulated through the chairman of the negotiating group on Agriculture; though it has an
176 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gambling, supra note 128, paras. 196, 204.
177 Appellate Body Report, EC—Export Subsidies on Sugar, supra note 95, para. 199.
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official document number (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24), it is not a decision by a W TO organ. By
contrast, the GATS Council formally adopted the Scheduling Guidelines.
Informal agreements among W TO members. In EC—Poultry,178 the panel faced the question
whether, as Brazil argued, the bilateral Oilseeds Agreement” that it had concluded with the EC
was relevant to the dispute. Noting that the Oilseeds Agreement had been negotiated within
the framework of GATT Article XXVIII, and citing the Canada/EC—Wheat arbitration, the
panel decided to consider that Agreement “to the extent relevant to the determination of the EC’s
obligations under the W TO agreements vis-à-vis Brazil.” On appeal, the AB found that “no
reversible error in the Panel’s treatment” of the Oilseeds Agreement. The AB recognized that
the Agreement was negotiated within the framework of GATT Article XXVIII and that it pro-
vided the basis for the tariff-rate quota that was at issue in the dispute. Accordingly, the AB
stated that “the Oilseeds Agreement may serve as a supplementary means of interpretation.”
Even assuming that an agreement has been proven, not every bilateral agreement will be
accorded the status of supplementary means by W TO adjudicating bodies. Evidence of a bilat-
eral agreement is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition: such an agreement must also be in
close connection with the covered agreements. This question arose first in the GATT years, in a
dispute between Canada and the EC. In connection with negotiations in the early 1960s con-
cerning Canada’s exports of wheat to the EC under the common agricultural policy, the parties
entered into an agreement that would have extended the time limits within which Canada
could challenge the EC’s treatment of its wheat exports under GATT Article XXVIII. In EC—
Article XXVIII,179 the EC challenged, before the arbitrator, Canada’s right to bring a claim
based on a bilateral agreement under the multilateral procedures of GATT. The arbitrator
disagreed:
In principle a claim based on a bilateral agreement cannot be brought under the multi-
lateral dispute settlement procedures of the GATT. An exception is warranted in this case
given the close connection of this particular bilateral agreement with the GATT, the fact
that the Agreement is consistent with the objectives of the GATT, and that both parties
joined in requesting recourse to the GATT Arbitration procedures.
Close connection between the subject matter of a bilateral agreement and the W TO Agree-
ment emerged as the criterion for deciding whether a bilateral agreement would be taken into
account by a W TO adjudicating body. A case of close connection appears in the panel report
in EC—Poultry mentioned above.180 The requirement for close connection should thus be
understood as akin to the historical context as understood under VCLT Article 31(2).
There was no such close connection found in EC—Commercial Vessels,181 where the panel
dealt with a bilateral agreement between Korea and the EC (called Agreed Minutes) whereby
the parties undertook commitments as to their shipyard sector. In the EC’s view, the reason
for permitting (as an exception) the subsidization of its own shipyard sector was that doing so
was a response to Korea’s inability to implement the Agreed Minutes (and cut down its own
178 Panel Report, EC—Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products, para. 202, W T/DS69/R
(adopted July 23, 1998), modified by Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Affecting Importation of Certain
Poultry Products, paras. 83–85, W T/DS69/AB/R (adopted July 23, 1998).
179 Canada/European Communities Article XXVIII Rights, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 80, 84 (1990).
180 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
181 Panel Report, EC—Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, paras. 7.130–.132, W T/DS301/R
(adopted June 20, 2005).
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subsidization, accordingly). Although the panel noted that the bilateral agreement was not a
covered agreement, it did use that agreement to clarify the factual aspects of the dispute while.
The panel did not use the agreement, however, as a legal ground for justifying the EC position.
When accepted as legally relevant, such agreements have been treated (explicitly in
EC—Poultry, implicitly in other cases) as supplementary means of interpretation. As a conse-
quence, recourse to them is not guaranteed. Absent such recourse, however, the W TO adju-
dicating body might be missing out on crucial factual elements that may help it to resolve the
dispute. Future panels will be well advised to treat such agreements as part of the historical con-
text, as per VCLT Article 31(2), assuming that there is no dispute as to their scope.
Circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the W TO Agreement. There are very few
instances in which W TO adjudicating bodies have taken into account the circumstances sur-
rounding of the W TO Agreement. One was Canada—Dairy,182 which was a peculiar case but
worth mentioning anyway. In that case, as briefly discussed above, the AB first reached the con-
clusion that Canada’s schedule was not clear on the issue of whether the concession entered by
Canada was meant to be continuation of past practice, as Canada had asserted. The AB con-
sequently decided to check the negotiating history of the concession. When moving there, the
AB first observed that, contrary to what had been the case with the EC-Brazil Oilseeds Agree-
ment, there was no bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States (the parties in
dispute). The absence of such an agreement did not, however, stop the AB from moving on
to examine the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the W TO Agreement. But
instead of checking the negotiating record, the AB referred to positions taken by the parties to
the dispute during the W TO panel proceedings to substantiate its view that the Canada’s com-
mitment was meant to be a continuation of past practice and not a commitment on minimum
access opportunities (which would have led to important practical ramifications). In the panel’s
view, noncontradicted statements made during the negotiation of the concession by the Cana-
dian representative amounted to a tacit agreement between the parties in dispute. It is probably
wise to treat this report as an outlier.183 It is the only instance where the AB accepted a tacit
agreement—assuming one existed (and the United States claimed that it did not)—as a cir-
cumstance surrounding the negotiation of the W TO Agreement. Moreover, in a subsequent
case, EC—Poultry (discussed above), the AB took a much tougher stance. In that case, a bilat-
eral agreement was in place, and the defendant (the EC) did not question either its existence
or its relevance. While taking note of this absence of objection by the EC, the AB still looked
for extra assurances that the agreement existed and that the parties concurred as to its existence.
It did not look for such extra assurances in Canada—Dairy.
In EC—Computer Equipment,184 the AB held that the classification practice of the EC (the
defendant in this case) was part of the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the W TO
Agreement. In the case at hand, the dispute between the United States and the defendant con-
cerned the latter’s tariff treatment of some computer equipment. The AB, in order to clarify
182 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Dairy, supra note 165, para. 139.
183 The AB has never shown such a spirit to accommodate contractual promises in subsequent case law. More-
over, as indicated above, it is highly debatable (if not wrong altogether) that a promise was actually given. The United
States contested, and the AB effectively accepted their position, that no agreement between the two partners was
ever concluded. Moreover, although the AB stated that it would look at the circumstances surrounding the nego-
tiations, its examination was limited to the submissions to the panel (over ten years later).
184 Appellate Body Report, EC—Computer Equipment, supra note 144, paras. 92, 95.
2008] 41
the EC’s commitment, moved to VCLT Article 32. In the AB’s view, for prior (to the entry
into force of the W TO Agreement) customs classification to be relevant it must be consistent;
“[i]nconsistent classification practice . . . cannot be relevant in interpreting the meaning of a
tariff concession.”
Domestic court decisions issued at the time of negotiation. The panel report in EC—Chicken
Cuts185 took the view that domestic court decisions could be regarded as supplementary means
of interpretation in accordance with VCLT Article 32. In the case at hand, as already discussed
above, Brazil challenged the EC’s unilateral decision to change the tariff treatment of salted
chicken cuts after the W TO Agreement was concluded. In Brazil’s view, the defendant’s deci-
sion violated the treaty and nullified its interests since the decision subjected chicken cuts to
a higher tariff regime. In defense, the EC argued, inter alia, that EC court decisions before the
entry into force of the W TO Agreement made it clear that salted chicken cuts had consistently
been subjected to the more burdensome of the potential tariff categories. Although it even-
tually rejected the EC’s substantive position, the panel accepted the relevance of such decisions
and reviewed them under the auspices of VCLT Article 32. On appeal, the AB confirmed the
panel’s understanding on this issue, adding that judgments will have less relevance than, for
example, legislative acts, since they are, by definition, transaction-specific.
GATT panel reports. Recall that Article XVI:1 of the W TO Agreement reads:
Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments, the W TO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices
followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established
in the framework of GATT 1947.
This clause is the institutional acknowledgement of the relevance of an (unidentified) series of
GATT documents. Case law has clarified that GATT panel reports come under the ambit of
this provision. In VCLT parlance, GATT reports have been used as supplementary means. In
practice, however, their importance has sometimes been more substantive than mere guidance.
During the GATT years, panel reports would not be adopted at the mere request of the win-
ning party. Panel reports were adopted by consensus. Practice reveals that in the majority of
the cases, reports were adopted through decisions by the GATT contracting parties. Some
reports were never adopted, however, and their legal relevance was therefore questionable. In
W TO practice, adjudicating bodies have referred not only to GATT adopted reports, but also,
on occasion, to unadopted reports—when they agreed with the legal reasoning reflected there-
in—in order to confirm their understanding of an issue.
The question whether adopted GATT panel reports represent decisions of the contracting
parties to GATT 1947—and whether they thus formed, by virtue of Article 1(b)(iv) of GATT
1994,186 an integral part of the GATT—arose in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II.187 The panel
held that adopted reports are an integral part of GATT 1994 since they are “other decisions
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947” within the meaning of Article 1(b)(iv)
185 Panel Report, EC—Chicken Cuts, supra note 133, para. 7.392; Appellate Body Report, supra note 133, paras.
310–45.
186 According to this provision, decisions by the GATT contracting parties are part of the GATT 1994, the legal
instrument that succeeded GATT 1947 (the original GATT).
187 Panel Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 148, para. 6.10; Appellate Body Report, Japan—
Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 148, at 15.
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of GATT 1994. The AB disagreed, holding that a decision to adopt a panel report is not a deci-
sion within the meaning of Article 1(b)(iv) of GATT 1994. In its view, adopted reports are,
instead, “an important part of the GATT acquis” (page 15).
The term GATT acquis was an invention of the AB and not detailed any further in Japan—
Alcoholic Beverages II. Following some months in limbo as to the precise meaning of the term
GATT acquis, the issue arose again in the panel report in U.S.—FSC.188 The panel followed
a different avenue this time when discussing the legal value of adopted GATT reports. In the
panel’s view, decisions to adopt reports should come under Article XVI of the W TO Agree-
ment. Such decisions are not binding on subsequent panels since, as Article XVI of the W TO
Agreement itself provides, “the W TO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and cus-
tomary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947.” Conse-
quently, the legal effect of adopted GATT reports is not to bind subsequent panels dealing with
the same issue, but simply to provide “guidance.” On appeal, the AB followed some convoluted
reasoning to end up in the same place:
We recognize that, as “decisions” within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the W TO
Agreement, the adopted panel reports in the Tax Legislation Cases, together with the 1981
Council action, could provide “guidance” to the W TO. The United States believes that
the “guidance” to be drawn from the 1981 Council action, through footnote 59, is that
the FSC measure is not an “export subsidy”. The present dispute involves the interpreta-
tion and application of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and the question of whether
the FSC measure involves export subsidies under that provision. In contrast, the 1981
Council action addresses the interpretation and application of Article XVI:4 of the GATT
1947. The “guidance” that the 1981 Council action might provide, therefore, depends,
in part, on the relationship between these different provisions.
As a result, it is now settled that adopted GATT panel reports can provide useful guidance to
subsequent W TO panels dealing with the same issue and that, in practice, recourse to them
can been made in order to confirm an interpretation reached through other elements of the
VCLT.189 A representative instance is Korea—Commercial Vessels,190 where the panel used the
findings of a GATT panel to grasp the meaning of the term serious prejudice appearing in the
SCM Agreement.
By contrast, unadopted GATT panel reports have, in principle, no legal status since they
cannot come under the ambit of Article XVI of the W TO Agreement. The panel in Japan—
Alcoholic Beverages II191 held that unadopted reports “have no legal status in either the GATT
188 Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” W T/DS108/R (adopted
Mar. 20, 2000); Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” para.
115, W T/DS108/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2000) (reported by Stanley L. Langbein at 94 AJIL 546 (2000)).
189 Jackson, looking into the case law of the prior forty years, concludes that GATT panel reports have persuasive
power over subsequent panels dealing with the same issue. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989). Jackson’s description is probably the
closest we can get to an accurate picture of their legal status: their impact is not guaranteed since there is nothing
like stare decisis in the GATT/W TO legal order; it depends on whether the subsequent panel is persuaded by the
reasoning included in the prior panel’s findings.
190 Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, paras. 7.591–.602, W T/DS273/R
(adopted Apr. 11, 2005).
191 Panel Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 148, para. 6.10; Appellate Body Report, Japan—
Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 148, at 16.
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or the W TO system since they have not been endorsed through decisions by the Contracting
Parties to GATT or W TO Members.” Nevertheless, practice shows that W TO panels will still
take them into account, assuming that their legal reasoning is persuasive, as the AB noted in
Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II: “a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning
of an un-adopted panel report that it considered to be relevant.” In this same vein, the panel
in U.S.—Lamb192 looked at both adopted and unadopted GATT reports to support one of its
findings. Likewise, the panel in EC—Pipe Fittings193 cited an unadopted GATT report to sup-
port its legal conclusion on a particular issue.
W TO panel and AB reports. As a formal matter, W TO panel and AB reports, like GATT
panel reports before, bind only the parties to the particular dispute and do not create binding
precedent. Even so, since the AB is limited to a review of legal issues only, on many occasions
its pronouncements are wider than transaction specific. Assuming for example, that the AB is
called to pronounce on the criteria that define likeness of goods under GATT Article III:2, its
decision on this score will be valid for all similar transactions. Indeed, assuming the absence of
distinguishing factors, the W TO membership will legitimately expect a repetition of the prior
case law. Moreover, adjudicating bodies have an incentive to be coherent (absent distinguish-
ing factors across cases, of course) since internal coherence of their case law is a contributing
factor to their legitimacy. In so single case (except, of course, for the first) have W TO adju-
dicating bodies omitted references to prior W TO case law, even if that case law ran contrary
to their conclusions.
In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II194 the AB explicitly acknowledged that case law is trans-
action-specific; it nevertheless noted that an equivalent provision in the ICJ Statute did not
prevent the ICJ from establishing its own jurisprudence:
It is worth noting that the Statute of the International Court of Justice has an explicit
provision, Article 59, to the same effect. This has not inhibited the development by that
Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in which considerable reliance on the value
of previous decisions is readily discernible.
In U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia),195 the AB clarified the legal relevance of WTO
panel and AB reports. In its view, the rationale for treating adopted GATT reports as part of
the GATT acquis also applied to W TO panel and AB reports:
This reasoning applies to adopted AB Reports as well. Thus, in taking into account the
reasoning in an adopted AB Report—a Report, moreover, that was directly relevant to the
Panel’s disposition of the issues before it—the Panel did not err. The Panel was correct in
using our findings as a tool for its own reasoning. Further, we see no indication that, in
192 Panel Report, United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from
New Zealand and Australia, para. 7.78, W T/DS177/R, W T/DS178/R (adopted May 16, 2001), modified by
Appellate Body Report, United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat
from New Zealand and Australia, W T/DS177/AB/R, W T/DS178/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2001).
193 Panel Report, EC—Pipe Fittings, supra note 51, para. 7.280.
194 Japan—Alcoholic Beverages III, supra note 148, at 13 n.30.
195 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Recourse by Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, para. 109, W T/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov. 21, 2001)
(reported by Louise de La Fayette at 96 AJIL 685 (2002)) [hereinafter U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia)].
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doing so, the Panel limited itself merely to examining the new measure from the perspec-
tive of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
It seems that by the term acquis, the AB aims to capture the legitimate expectations by W TO
members to see prior case law applied in future adjudicating experience, if relevant (that is,
absent distinguishing factors across cases). This point was further clarified in U.S.—Line
Pipe,196 where the AB had the opportunity to explain that it will resort to its prior case law
when, in the absent of other distinguishing features, the former and instant cases present factual
similarities. Yet another illustration is EC—Sardines,197 where the AB included extensive ref-
erences to prior case law in order to support its position that it has the legal authority to accept
amicus curiae briefs.
A survey of the case law reveals instances in which panels dealing with the same issue have
reached inconsistent conclusions.198 Since the majority of those reports are being appealed,
however, many of these divergences may be eliminated. By contrast, when the AB actually has
ruled on a particular issue, panels have rarely deviated. One such instance is Argentina—Pre-
served Peaches,199 where the panel voiced its disagreement with one of the AB’s holdings. In the
overwhelming majority of the cases, however, panels start their interpretative exercises through
references to the AB case law. Although legally not bound to do so, panels will follow the AB
either because they are genuinely persuaded by the reasoning or because they are aware that in
case of deviation, there is little chance of eventually overturning prior case law.200 The panel
report in India—Patents (EC)201 eloquently captures this point:
[P]anels are not bound by previous decisions of panels or the Appellate Body even if the
subject-matter is the same . . . . However, . . . we will take into account the conclusions
and reasoning in the Panel and Appellate Body reports in W T/DS50. Moreover, in our
examination we believe that we should give significant weight to both Article 3.2 of the
DSU, which stresses the role of the W TO dispute settlement system in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system, and to the need to avoid inconsistent
rulings (which concern has been referred to by both parties). In our view, these consid-
erations form the basis of the requirement of the referral to the “original panel” wherever
possible under Article 10.4 of the DSU.
196 Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Car-
bon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, para. 102, W T/DS202/AB/R (adopted Mar. 8, 2002).
197 Appellate Body Report, EC—Sardines, supra note 112, paras. 155–62.
198 For one such example, see the panel reports in EC—Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Mem-
ory Chips from Korea, W T/DS299/R (adopted Aug. 3, 2005), and United States—Countervailing Duty Investigation
on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, W T/DS296/R (adopted July 20, 2005).
The EC and United States countervailed Korea’s alleged subsidization of Korean companies. Korea complained
against both measures, presented identical claims and arguments to the two panels, but lost in one case (versus the
EC) and lost in the other (versus the United States).
199 Panel Report, Argentina—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches, para. 7.24,
W T/DS238/R (adopted Apr. 15, 2003). More recently, a couple of panels dealing with the practice of zeroing
(where, an investigating authority will not compute in the calculation of dumping margin transactions where no
dumping has been found) have explicitly stated their disagreements with the AB’s condemnation of the practice.
See, for example, the panel report in United States—Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, W T/DS322/R
(adopted Jan. 23, 2007), and its findings at pages 138–77, 182–90, and 192–94.
200 Since the losing party might have the incentive to appeal and to request from the AB that it reverse the panel’s
findings, thereby reaffirming its own case law.
201 Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, para. 7.30,
W T/DS79/R (adopted Sept. 22, 1998).
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On most occasions, the AB gives the impression that it takes its own case law quite seriously.
In only a few cases has it neglected its relevant case law on an issue,202 and in no case has it clearly
stated that it was deciding a revirement de jurisprudence (overruling prior case law). In the
majority of the cases, the AB starts its analysis recalling its prior case law on an issue, although
it often adds helpful, new twists in the process.
Ideally, W TO adjudicating bodies should always refer to their prior case law. This is not to
say that they should always reach the same outcome. Consistency is not an unqualified value,
since one can be consistently wrong. In the presence of distinguishing factors, or even better
intellectual arguments, those adjudicating bodies should be encouraged to change their
minds—provided that they have explained their reasons for doing so.203
Previous GATT agreements. During the Tokyo round, a series of agreements were signed (the
so-called Tokyo round codes). Participation in those agreements was optional. Most of these
agreements have been carried over into the Uruguay round; for example, the Uruguay round
AD agreement, for example, succeeded the Tokyo round AD agreement. Importantly, how-
ever, those two agreements (as well as many others carried over from one round to the other)
are not identical. At the Uruguay round, participation (with the exception of the “plurilateral
agreements”) was not optional; these agreements were considered part of the “single under-
taking.” Although content is not identical, many of the provisions appearing in Tokyo round
agreements have been carried over as such in the corresponding Uruguay round agreements.
Reference to the Tokyo round agreements has thus been deemed appropriate in order to con-
firm an interpretation already reached.204 The Tokyo round agreements have been consistently
treated as supplementary means of interpretation. An illustration of this pattern can be seen in
Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties,205 where the panel dealt with a dispute on the con-
sistency of Argentina’s measures with the AD Agreement. In order to confirm its interpretation
of Article 2, the panel referred to the more explicit wording of the corresponding provision in
the Tokyo round AD Agreement.
UN Resolutions. The arbitrator’s report in U.S.—FSC (Article 22.6—U.S.)206 contains an
explicit reference to the International Law Commission’s report on state responsibility,
although he did not specify what its legal value was. The report, adopted as a resolution of the
UN General Assembly, was intended to express reflect customary international law.
202 One good example can be seen in United States—Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from
the European Communities, W T/DS212/AB/R (adopted Jan. 8, 2003), and the United States—Imposition of Coun-
tervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom,
W T/DS138/AB/R (adopted June 7, 2000). As Grossman and Mavroidis explain, the AB reached the second time
it dealt with the same issue (does the price paid matter when previously subsidized operations are being auctioned
off?) the opposite conclusion than the first time. The first time it ruled that a market price paid at auction always
extinguishes the benefits previously received, and the second that it is not necessarily the case. Remarkably the sub-
sequent report cites the previous one to support its conclusions. Gene M. Grossman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Recur-
ring Misunderstanding of Non-recurring Subsidies, in THE W TO CASE-LAW OF 2002, at 78 (Henrik Horn & Petros
C. Mavroidis eds., 2004).
203 On this score, see POSNER, supra note 21.
204 As noted above, however, the W TO adjudicating body in question made no explicit reference to VCLT Arti-
cle 32.
205 Panel Report, Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties, supra note 52, para. 7.358.
206 Arbitration Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” Recourse to Arbitra-
tion by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, W T/DS108/ARB
(adopted Aug. 30, 2002).
46 [Vol. 102:000THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
OECD guidelines. The panel report in Mexico—Telecoms207 relied on the OECD guidelines
to confirm its understanding of the term “anti-competitive practice.” In doing so, the AB
treated the OECD guidelines as supplementary means of interpretation.
Decisions by international courts. Occasionally, panels and the AB refer to decisions by other
courts as means of supporting their own decisions. An appropriate illustration is India—Pat-
ents (U.S.),208 where the AB referred to the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) to support its finding that the determination of domestic law should
be treated as a factual matter. In doing so, the AB did not clarify the legal status of such PCIJ
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it was arguably treating the PCIJ case law as supplementary means
of interpretation.
Domestic law and practice. Pursuant to the VCLT (Article 27), domestic law cannot trump
W TO law (a point explicitly acknowledged in the panel report in Argentina—Poultry Anti-
dumping Duties).209 This does not mean, however, that domestic law cannot provide a source
of inspiration for W TO law, especially as a gap-filling exercise: in EC—Tariff Preferences210
the panel examined domestic codes of conduct for attorneys-at-law—such as the objectivity
and independence of legal counsel’s professional, the right to consent to joint representation
by the same counsel, and the equal right to discontinue such joint representation when conflicts
potentially arise—on the way to deciding that such common features of professional ethical
codes are equally appropriate in analyzing representational conflict of interest in within the
W TO dispute settlement system. The panel, in this context, examined the Codes of Conduct
of the American Bar Association, some U.S. states, Canada, the European Union, and some
EU member states.
Doctrine. Sporadic references can be found in panel reports to the teachings and writings of
highly qualified publicists in GATT law, but these references in the early W TO years were rare.
The quantity of references has picked up over the years, usually in a self-serving mood (that is,
to support interpretations reached). Doctrine has always been used as supplementary means
of interpretation.211
Other Interpretative Elements
There are interpretative elements that panels have used but have failed to classify formally.
Although it seems that such elements were used as supplementary means of interpretation,
their formal absence of classification requires that we classify them under “Other.” Most nota-
bly, W TO adjudicating bodies have used international treaties to interpret terms of the W TO
Agreement and its annexes. In its original and its compliance reports in U.S.—Shrimp,212 the
207 Panel Report, Mexico—Telecoms, supra note 32, para. 7.236.
208 Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
para. 65, W T/DS50/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998).
209 Panel Report, Argentina—Poultry Anti-dumping Duties, supra note 52, para. 7.108.
210 Panel Report, EC—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, para. 7.11,
W T/DS246/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2004), modified by Appellate Body Report, EC—Conditions for the Granting
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, W T/DS/246/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2004).
211 In U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 116, para. 114, for example, the AB cited Ian Sinclair in support of its position
that recourse to VCLT Article 32 was warranted in order to confirm a conclusion is sought or to determine the
meaning of a provision that remains uncertain after exhausting all references included in VCLT Article 31.
212 Id.; Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia), supra note 195.
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AB referred to various regional and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The AB’s
invocation of such agreements in its original judgment led to a further dispute between the par-
ties, and in the compliance ruling, the AB clarified the normative significance that it attached
to such agreements in resolving the dispute between the parties: in its view, international agree-
ments such as MEAs may not only be used as legal interpretation, but help to establish a wide
agreement on certain facts (such as whether a species in endangered or whether certain
resources are exhaustible), where such facts are pertinent to the application of a given legal pro-
vision, in this case GATT Article XX(g) (conservation of exhaustible natural resources). As the
AB itself explained in U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia),213 the agreement is not thereby
converted into an autonomous legal standard but is merely evidence of noncomparable—and
possibly discriminatory—treatment of nonsignatories:
124. As we stated in United States—Shrimp, “the protection and conservation of highly
migratory species of sea turtles . . . demands concerted and cooperative efforts on the part
of the many countries whose waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle migra-
tions”. Further, the “need for, and the appropriateness of, such efforts have been recog-
nized in the W TO itself as well as in a significant number of other international instru-
ments and declarations”. For example, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development states, in part, that “[e]nvironmental measures addressing
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on
international consensus”. Clearly, and “as far as possible”, a multilateral approach is
strongly preferred. Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the application
of a measure that is provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX
of the GATT 1994; it is another to require the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a
condition of avoiding “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” under the chapeau of
Article XX. We see, in this case, no such requirement.
. . . .
130. At no time in United States—Shrimp did we refer to the Inter-American Convention
as a “benchmark”. The Panel might have chosen another and better word—perhaps, as
suggested by Malaysia, “example”. Yet it seems to us that the Panel did all that it should
have done with respect to the Inter-American Convention, and did so consistently with
our approach in United States—Shrimp. The Panel compared the efforts of the United
States to negotiate the Inter-American Convention with one group of exporting W TO
Members with the efforts made by the United States to negotiate a similar agreement with
another group of exporting W TO Members. The Panel rightly used the Inter-American
Convention as a factual reference in this exercise of comparison. It was all the more relevant
to do so given that the Inter-American Convention was the only international agreement
that the Panel could have used in such a comparison. As we read the Panel Report, it is clear
to us that the Panel attached a relative value to the Inter-American Convention in making
this comparison, but did not view the Inter-American Convention in any way as an abso-
lute standard. Thus, we disagree with Malaysia’s submission that the Panel raised the Inter-
American Convention to the rank of a “legal standard”. The mere use by the Panel of the
Inter-American Convention as a basis for a comparison did not transform the Inter-Amer-
ican Convention into a “legal standard”. Furthermore, although the Panel could have cho-
sen a more appropriate word than “benchmark” to express its views, Malaysia is mistaken
213 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia), supra note 195, paras. 124, 130.
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in equating the mere use of the word “benchmark”, as it was used by the Panel, with the
establishment of a legal standard.
The AB report in EC—Asbestos214 contains references to World Health Organization conven-
tions. Here, as in U.S.—Shrimp cited above, the AB appears to have used these instruments as
evidence of a wide agreement on a factual state of affairs—the toxicity of asbestos and its seri-
ousness as a public health challenge.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Background
It is for the W TO members to draw the list of sources of law. The mandate that the members
gave to the W TO judge was to interpret the W TO contract, without undoing the agreed bal-
ance of rights and obligations (DSU Article 3.2). The legislative guidance (DSU Article 3.2)
to have recourse to customary rules of interpretation, when interpreting the W TO contract,
has been understood by the W TO judge as an implicit reference to the VCLT. Nothing shock-
ing here, since the VCLT was, in this respect, codification of customary law. The judge is thus
an agent with a mandate to use VCLT in a manner that does not undo the will of principals.
The questions arises whether the VCLT is a complete contract. The answer has to be neg-
ative for at least two reasons: first, the VCLT does not explicitly refer to the precise weight that
should be given to each one of its interpretative elements,215 and second, the boundaries among
the various elements mentioned in the VCLT are not always clear-cut, with the consequence
that the classification exercise itself will affect outcomes.216 This latter point is especially
important in the context of this article: due to the incompleteness of the VCLT, the W TO
judge has some discretion in classifying the various interpretative elements; their legal signif-
icance will depend on the outcome of the classification exercise. Moreover, as we saw earlier,
the W TO judge had to look outside the VCLT to decide, for example, on how to allocate the
burden of proof.
The Practice
Against this background, the survey of WTO practice leads us to conclude:
— The W TO judge uses the VCLT in a compartmentalized manner: the conclusion
about the interpretation of a certain term will, in the overwhelming majority of the
cases, be reached when examining the ordinary meaning of the terms and will
merely be confirmed through recourse to other VCLT elements.
— The direct consequence of this approach is twofold: first, there will be no need to
look actively for contextual elements, or supplementary means, since the conclusion
has been already reached, and all interpretative elements will merely support a fait
214 Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos, supra note 115, paras. 114, 135.
215 Recall the central argument of the present article that context should be the dominant element. We will return
to it shortly.
216 Recall our discussion concerning the boundaries between supplementary means and context: the list provides
only two examples, with the consequence that the former category is indeterminate, and numerous elements could
just as easily fall under one category or the other—albeit with extremely different legal consequences.
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accompli; and second, the W TO agent has classified, when in doubt, sources under
supplementary means of interpretation and thus reduced their legal significance. A
by-product of this approach is that we see fewer elements used.
— The W TO judge has failed to provide the rationale for its manner of treating sec-
ondary law.
A Critique
The title of VCLT Article 31 is “General Rule of Interpretation.” Presumably, the legislator
chose singular over plural (rule, not rules) for a good reason, and that reason must be that the
various elements are part of a whole. It is those elements together that will provide the words
in a treaty with their (intended) meaning. Words are, almost by definition, contextual, and
their meanings vary accordingly. W TO adjudicating bodies have acknowledged as much by,
on occasion, giving a different meaning to the same term: the term like (products) in GATT
Article III:4 was accorded a wider coverage than the term like (products) in GATT Article III:2.
In the majority of cases, however, the adjudicating bodies have refused to consider that the
meaning of treaty terms may differ with the context. Indeed, it is the context that defines the
meaning of the terms used, and W TO adjudicating bodies should first ask the question “Why
has a particular instrument become a W TO commitment?” before asking what that the par-
ticular details of that commitment are. The AB, as briefly discussed above, has recently
attempted to contain textualism (versus contextualism), arguing that recourse to dictionaries
should be the first, and not the last, step. Empirically speaking, this declaration is one that has
hardly been followed in practice. Some illustrations are appropriate here. In EC—Tariff Pref-
erences,217 the AB paid disproportionate attention to words indicating that the set of developing
countries could be divided into subsets, each to enjoy larger or narrower preferences. Based on
this understanding, the AB found in favor of the EC approach of conditioning benefits upon
the satisfaction of unilaterally defined criteria.218 It did not even ask the question whether dis-
tinguishing between various developing countries should be a multilateral exercise or simply
a matter of individual preferences. Had it done that, the AB would have noticed that the con-
text of the “Enabling Clause”219 clearly supports multilaterally agreed, but not unilaterally
imposed, distinctions, like the one already included between developing and least developed
countries. In U.S.—Offset Act (Byrd Amendment),220 the AB condemned the U.S. practice
because it goes against dumping (since it discourages dumping) and is not an antidumping
duty. The whole judgment rests on its understanding of term against. What if Byrd payments
incite more dumping, as Horn and Mavroidis221 show to be theoretically possible? Should not
the AB, instead of spending time and effort to understand the many meanings of the term
against, simply try to understand what was intended to be covered by the provision in question?
217 Appellate Body Report, EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 121.
218 Recall that the AB condemned the EC practice only because the list appearing in its Generalized System of
Preferences was closed. Had it been open, the AB would have admitted it, assuming that the AB considered the
selection criteria objective.
219 Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,
Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203.
220 Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), supra note 106.
221 Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, in
THE W TO CASE-LAW OF 2003, at 52 (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2006).
50 [Vol. 102:000THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The term “so as to afford protection,” which was included in GATT Article III, has been deprived
of any substantive meaning as a result of an interpretative pattern that is oblivious to the very
purpose of that article. As a result of this approach, in Chile—Alcoholic Beverages,222 for exam-
ple, Chile was condemned for violating its obligations under GATT Article III because it had
enacted a tax regime whereby the higher the alcoholic content of a drink, the more burdensome
the taxation—notwithstanding the evidence that Chilean producers had been burdened the
most by this very regime.223
W TO adjudicating bodies will do much better by simply dropping recourse to dictionaries
and by starting to ask questions concerning the purpose of the contractual terms whose mean-
ing they seek. Conclusions concerning the meaning of terms should come after exhaustion of
all the elements of VCLT Article 31 and not after a superficial look at a dictionary or two.
What also matters—especially given the purposes of this article—is the external effect of
textualism, and not textualism itself: by relying on the text and taking the view that words are
decisive, panels and the AB have reduced the opportunity for extra-W TO law to inform the
interpretation of the W TO contract. For the sake of argument, let us assume that such sources
should be understood as supplementary means, as the AB itself prefers to see them, whenever
it has recourse to such elements. Recourse to supplementary means is, as per VCLT Article 32,
a matter of discretion—and therefore not a matter of obligation. But discretion can be used or
abused, and absence of obligation should not be equated with carte blanche. Take U.S.—
Shrimp,224 for example: had the AB paid attention to the preparatory work of GATT Article
XX(g), it would have detected that the transactions that negotiators had in mind related to non-
living resources only.225 The end result of the dispute might have been correct, and it was also
a politically welcome outcome. But it is still puzzling how a term such as exhaustible natural
222 Appellate Body Report, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, W T/DS87/AB/R, W T/DS110/AB/R
(adopted Jan. 12, 2000).
223 See the excellent analysis in Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment—or Equal Treatment, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921 (2002). The affection for textualism
is especially noticeable in the safeguards case law, where the AB has based some of its conclusions on the very thinnest
of distinctions: it held, for example, that unforeseen developments should be distinguished from unforeseeable devel-
opments, without explaining where the difference lies, and that significant injury is not insignificant injury, again
without explaining what the two terms mean. See Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Juris-
prudence, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 261 (2003). This extreme textualism is not, however, confined to safeguards case
law. As Trebilcock and Soloway show, the AB has distinguished science from nonscience in the SPS case-law with-
out explaining what the distinguishing criteria are. Michael Trebilcock & Julie Soloway, International Trade Policy
and Domestic Food Safety Regulation: The Case for Substantial Deference by the W TO Dispute Settlement Body Under
the SPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 537 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy
& James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
224 Supra note 116.
225 See, for example, UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/50 (Nov. 13, 1946) at pp. 5ff, a document from the London Con-
ference. There negotiators were discussing, inter alia, the ambit of Article 37 of the London Draft, which became
GATT Article XX. The remarks of the Indian delegate (Ganguli), along with the reactions to them, lend support
to the argument that negotiators saw GATT Article XX(g) as protecting nonliving resources, whereas the protection
of living organisms was the domain of GATT Article XX(b) (which, of course, is associated with a more stringent
legal test for compliance). As Steve Charnovitz notes in Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX,
25 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1991), in parallel negotiation concerning an international commodity agreement (fish-
eries and wildlife), the same term, exhaustible natural resources, was used to cover both living and nonliving organ-
isms. A remark by the chairman of the working group discussing the commodity agreement (Wyndham-
White)—to the effect that the term appearing in Article XX(g) GATT covered fisheries as well—does lend to
confusion. Nevertheless, an examination of the history discloses that the term exhaustible natural resources covered
nonliving resources only. For a start, the discussion about fisheries was within a different context—namely, that of
a commodity agreement that would come under the ITO, not the GATT itself. Moreover, subsequent discussions
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resources, which is anything but self-interpreting, suddenly becomes so clear: the AB invoked
the “principle of evolutionary interpretation” to justify its choice—at best, an obscure prin-
ciple of interpretation that has rarely been invoked in international adjudication—and then
used it to counterbalance and overrule the will of negotiators! The AB’s handling of the Modal-
ities Paper226 provides yet another example. The document was clearly meant to be used in
order to calculate the commitments made. The absence of a formal decision on it was both con-
sonant with standard negotiating practice at the W TO and appropriate since the document
was meant to be used in that particular negotiation (and it was, indeed, so used). Should not
the AB have paid at least some attention to that document instead of dismissing its relevance
altogether and trying to re-construct itself what might have been intended in a negotiation that
occurred ten years before its judgment?
The unwillingness of WTO adjudicating bodies to look beyond the text is not confined to
their mistreatment of some preparatory work; international treaties relating to the same subject
matter have also been neglected. The most explicit pronouncement to this effect came in the
recent panel report in EC—Biotech Products,227 where the panel refused to look into MEAs
with broad participation, simply because they had not been signed by all W TO members.
VCLT Article 30 makes it clear, however, that to the extent that the rights of other parties to
a treaty are not affected, a court should look into treaties concluded between a subset of the
original partners, provided that the subsequent and the original treaties deal with the same sub-
ject matter. Recall that it was the AB itself that, in its first-ever dispute,228 declared that it would
interpret the W TO contract in accordance with the VCLT.
So far, for a number of reasons, the outcomes of WTO adjudications have not suffered much
from this attitude of neglecting extra-W TO sources. The ever increasing importance of non-
tariff barriers (NTBs), however, suggests that this situation might change in the not too distant
future. Moreover, reference to other legal sources might serve to increase the legitimacy of
reports, especially on controversial issues. Let us assume, for example, that the AB had checked
the preparatory work of GATT Article XX(g) and had come to the conclusion (as it had in the
actual case) that perverse results would ensue from adhering to outmoded attitudes and con-
fining the term exhaustible natural resources to nonliving resources. In that situation, the AB
would be well-advised to look at CITES and use that agreement as supplementary means: 169
states now accept that all forms of sea turtles are endangered species. Instead, during the U.S.—
Shrimp litigation, the AB opted for some oblique references to CITES without clarifying the
legal significance of this broad consensus.229 It is worth noting, too, that as a result of the ever
increasing concern with environmental, public health, and related issues, there are many agree-
ments in addition to CITES that could help W TO adjudicating bodies when dealing with issues
of that character.
during the Havana Conference confirm that negotiators treated fisheries and wildlife as a special case. For this last
point, see UN Docs. E.CONF.2/C.5/9, at 21(1947), and E.CONF.2/C.5/SR.7, at 2 (1947).
226 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
227 Panel Report, EC—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, W T/DS291/R,
W T/DS292/R, W T/DS293/R, corr.1 & adds.1–9 (adopted Nov. 21, 2006) (reported by Simon Lester at 101
AJIL 453 (2007)).
228 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 111, and accompanying text.
229 CITES could thus help the judge to reach a better view of the criteria for classifying a species as endangered
or resources as exhaustible. And instead of guessing what should and not be so classified, the judge could cite—in
support of his or her decision—a convention representing today’s most sophisticated understanding of those terms.
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Recourse to extra-W TO sources might well be required in order to fill some inescapable
gaps. Recall that, absent recourse to the principle actori incumbit probatio, the AB would have
had a hard time to explain how the burden of proof is allocated under W TO law. But the need
for gap filling will continue to arise; the need to allocate the burden of proof was not unique.
It must be cautioned, however, that the use of extra-W TO sources230 should satisfy the strict
test established in Trachtman:231 as a matter of interpreting W TO law and not, for example,
as means of circumventing the (occasional) absence of will by the MEA partners to establish
a forum for adjudicating their MEA-related disputes.
Finally, the treatment of secondary law by W TO adjudicating bodies leaves much to be
desired. Barfield232 has criticized the imbalance between the legislative and the adjudicative
function in the W TO. It is true that, as things stand, the majority of the legislative output is
confined to the renegotiation of agreements; new agreements emerge only when a trade round
has been successfully concluded. This is not to suggest that there is no activity in between
rounds. As is clear from our previous discussion of the TRIPS amendment,233 such activity can
be quite formal. Practice indicates a willingness to look into some secondary law—but no
explicit discussion of its status. Implicitly, the AB seems to accept that form matters, since it
is an appropriate proxy for legislative intent. This makes sense, and the AB should go ahead and
be explicit about it. At the same time, it will find it worth looking at the various decisions/rec-
ommendations that other, hierarchically lower W TO organs adopt, and use them as interpre-
tative elements (supplementary means) of the W TO sources of law. The ADP Committee rec-
ommendations on the length of POI234 are an excellent example of how these elements may
be put to good use.
No (Major) Change Required
All of the suggestions made above can take place using the tools already included in the
VCLT.235 W TO adjudicating bodies would thus be required to honor—no more, and no
less—their pronouncements to the effect that they will observe the VCLT. What remains to
be seen, however, is whether the current system of using ad hoc panelists can rise to the task
as outlined above. It is probably unrealistic to request from trade delegates (the typical pan-
elists) to suddenly change their perspective and to move outside the (illusory) comfort of the
230 Recall that in EC—Chicken Cuts, supra note 133, the AB held that the HS treaty is part of the W TO’s context.
So far, nothing else has been so classified in W TO case law, but it remains unclear why even the HS treaty should
be considered context. The AB states in paragraph 197 of its report that the HS treaty is context, in paragraph 198
that it is context because the Agreement on Agriculture refers to it (without explaining what to make of the absence
of any reference to the HS treaty in the GATT, which regulates all nonagricultural products), and in paragraph 199
that it is context because of broad consensus among W TO members to use it when scheduling. Absent further infor-
mation on the rationale for treating a legal document as context, we simply cannot predict what else could be so
understood.
231 See supra note 21.
232 CLAUDE BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (2001).
233 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 47–55.
235 There is consequently no need even to enter the (ongoing) discussion on fragmentation of public international
law.
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covered agreements in order to adjudicate disputes.236 Reasoning backward from this point,
the current design of panels is probably the main reason why trading nations generally abstain
from submitting claims that would demand that panels step outside the four corners of the cov-
ered agreements. The changing needs of WTO adjudication thus present, in this context, yet
another argument to professionalize the paneling of WTO disputes.
236 The influence of the W TO secretariat, the only inflexible element in panel formation, is difficult to ascertain.
There are reasons to believe, however, that it accepts the current state of affairs. See Håkan Nordström, The World
Trade Organization Secretariat in a Changing World, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 819 (2005).
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